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2Introduction
For centuries the definition of fatherhood under American law was simple:  the
mother’s husband.  A legal doctrine that originated in English law called “the marital 
presumption” permitted courts to assume that the mother’s husband was both the child’s 
functional and biological father.1   The policy rationales for the presumption were that it 
protected children from the legal and social impact of illegitimacy and preserved the 
sanctity of the perceived cornerstone of a healthy society—a family consisting of a 
husband, wife and children.2   The marital presumption also had some factual 
justification.  For a range of reasons, the number of children who were born to unmarried 
parents in early 20th century America was substantially lower than it is today.3  Thus, the 
legal -- i.e. married -- father, the biological father and the functional father were, in fact, 
often the same person. 
The dramatic shift in family composition over the last several decades in the 
United States has made the marital presumption increasingly inadequate as the sole 
definition of fatherhood under the law.  The United States Government’s 2000 census 
made clear that married mothers and traditional families are on the decline.4  The number 
of women raising children in the United States without a husband grew both in number 
1
 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *459. The only recognized exceptions were cases where a man was 
sterile or impotent, or outside the country. Id.
2
 For a discussion of the privileged status accorded the marital or “unitary” family in Anglo-American 
jurisprudence, see Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). See also, Katharine T. Bartlett, 
Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the 
Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879, 888 (1984) (discussing the role of natural law in the law’s 
view of the nuclear family as “the basic building block of society.”)
3 See note 40 infra and accompanying text.
4 TAVIA SIMMONS & GRACE O’NEILL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU; “HOUSEHOLDS AND FAMILIES: 2000,”  (Sept.
2001), http://www.census.gov/population/www/cen2000/briefs.html.
3and in percentage of total household in the last decade alone.5 Although divorce 
contributed significantly to this increase, the number of births to unmarried parents has 
also increased dramatically in the last several decades.6 Only one quarter of American 
households now fit the traditional family model of married parents and children.7
The functional meaning of fatherhood has also changed significantly over time. 
The common law conception of paternal functions was expressed almost exclusively in 
economic terms.  Although many debate the extent of the change,8 most agree that men 
today are participating more in family life than did their fathers.9 The once clearly 
defined role of mother as caregiver and father as breadwinner has eroded.  In addition to 
the changing demographic and social landscape, scientific advances from genetic testing 
to new reproductive techniques have made defining fatherhood more complex.10
The law has made some attempt to refine its definition of father in the face 
of these changes.  A series of United States Supreme Court decisions beginning with 
Stanley v. Illinois11 in 1972, recognized that unmarried fathers, linked by both biology 
and some measure of involvement in a child’s life, had both rights and responsibilities 
5 Id. at 7. Nearly 25 million American children did not live with their fathers in 2000 compared with fewer 
than 10 million in 1960. William C. Smith, Fathers Charge Legal Bias Toward Moms Hamstrings Them As 
Full-Time Parents, A.B.A. J. , February 2003, 38 at 40.     
6
 See note 40 infra and accompanying text. 
7 SIMMONS & O’NEILL, supra note 4 at 4 tbl.2.
8 ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE TIME BIND 131-132 (1997); See also, Naomi Cahn, The Power of Caretaking, 
12 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM, 177, 182-83 (2000) (summarizing studies demonstrating that mothers still 
assume a greater share of child caretaking); Theresa Arendell, Soccer Moms and the New Care Work
(Berkeley Ctr. For Working Families, Working Paper No. 16, 2000); Naomi Gerstel, The Third Shift: 
Gender and Care Work Outside the Home, 23 QUALITATIVE SOC. 467 (2000); MONA HARRINGTON, CARE 
AND EQUALITY: INVENTING A NEW FAMILY POLITICS (1999); ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT: 
WORKING PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME (1989). 
9 See, e.g., NICHOLAS W. TOWNSEND, THE PACKAGE DEAL: MARRIAGE, WORK AND FATHERHOOD IN 
MEN’S LIVES (2000); KATHLEEN GERSON, NO MAN’S LAND: MEN’S CHANGING COMMITMENTS TO FAMILY
(1993).
10 See e.g., JANET L. DOLGIN, DEFINING THE FAMILY: LAW, TECHNOLOGY, AND REPRODUCTION IN AN 
UNEASY AGE, (1st ed. 1997); Recent Developments in the Law: IV. Changing Realities of Parenthood: The 
Law’s Response to the Evolving American Family and Emerging Reproductive Technologies, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 2052 (2003).
11
 405 U.S. 645 (1972).  See infra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
4that should be recognized under the law.  The law has also given limited recognition to 
men who have served as “social” or “functional” fathers but were neither married to their 
child’s mother when the child was born nor biologically connected to the child.12  More 
recently, there have been policy and legislative efforts designed to strengthen and 
facilitate the bonds between children and their fathers.13  While many of these new 
policies are designed to encourage fatherhood within marriage,14 many policymakers 
have come to recognize the importance of creating social and economic supports for 
unmarried fathers to foster continuing paternal involvement in children’s lives.15
While these developments have fostered a broader and more multidimensional 
legal conception of fatherhood, a series of recent judicial decisions and legislative 
enactments around the country threaten to push fatherhood back into a narrow box. The 
once limited definition based on marriage is now being replaced by an equally limited 
definition based on biology. This new definition of fatherhood has developed in the 
12 See notes 71-74 infra and accompanying text.
13
 Dana Milbank, A Marriage of Family and Policy, THE WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 15, 2001 at A1; See, 
e.g.,  Deb Price, Fatherhood Defines Bush Pick, THE DETROIT NEWS, June 17, 2001 at 13A.
14
 The 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (hereinafter PRWORA) 
provided federal funding to states to promote the formation and maintenance of marriage as well as the 
reduction of out-of-wedlock pregnancies.  Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). THEODORA OOMS, ET. AL, CENTER FOR LAW AND SOCIAL 
POLICY, BEYOND MARRIAGE LICENSES 5 (2004).  The Act included “illegitimacy bonuses,” funding made 
available to the top five states to reduce the rate of births to unmarried parents with no increase in abortion 
rates.  ALTERNATIVES TO MARRIAGE PROJECT, LET THEM EAT WEDDING RINGS, 4 (2002) available at
http://www.unmarried.org/rings.html.  Other state marriage promotion programs funded by TANF include 
a program in West Virginia, where families receiving TANF benefits are awarded a $100 bonus if the 
family is headed by a legally married couple.  Marriage on the Public Policy Agenda: What Do Policy 
Makers Need to Know From Research?, POVERTY RESEARCH INSIGHTS (National Poverty Center, Gerald 
R. School of Public Policy, University of Michigan), Winter 2004, at 4.  Arizona, Oklahoma, Utah and 
Wisconsin are also using TANF funds to promote marriage through “marriage handbooks” and media 
campaigns.  ALTERNATIVES TO MARRIAGE PROJECT, at 3.  In 2002-2003, the Administration for Children 
and Families at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services committed $90 million to many 
marriage-related activities including demonstration grants, research and evaluation projects and technical 
assistance.  These grants focus on, among other things, emphasizing the importance of marriage in refugee 
families, and studies on family economic self-sufficiency.  OOMS, at 8-10.
15 See, e.g., Ronald B. Mincy & Hillard Douncy, There Must Be 50 Ways to Start a Family, in THE 
FATHERHOOD MOVEMENT 83 (Horn et al. eds., 1999).
5context of a series of cases in which men have assumed the role of father in children’s 
lives and later, often after many years, seek genetic testing to be relieved of the legal 
obligations of fatherhood.16  While such “delegitamizing” of children would not be 
permitted under rules establishing fatherhood based on marriage or caretaking, these 
definitions of fatherhood are being increasingly rejected in favor of a single criteria for 
fatherhood based on biology. Over the last several years, many states have adopted 
policies by judicial decision or statute that relieve men of their legal status as fathers if 
genetic testing excludes them on biological grounds.17  As a result, children are becoming 
fatherless and losing the emotional connection, companionship, nurturing and economic 
support that fathers can provide.
 This emerging definition of fatherhood based solely on biology has not 
developed to serve any of the traditional goals of family law – protecting children and 
preserving family stability.18   Rather, this trend appears to be one of the unintended 
consequences of three decades of federal and state legislation designed to reform the 
nation’s welfare system.19  These policies were crafted to reduce welfare costs and 
improve conditions for custodial mothers and children through more vigorous 
establishment and collection of child support.20 These policies have had mixed results in 
meeting those goals. At the same time, applied most aggressively against low-income 
16 See notes 176-181 infra and accompanying text.
17 Id. 
18 CARL E. SCHNEIDER & MARGARET F. BRINIG, AN INVITATION TO FAMILY LAW 153-54, 157-61 (1996) 
(describing two of the functions of family law as protecting vulnerable family members and supporting the 
social institutions of marriage and family).
19 See notes 77-119 infra and accompanying text.
20 Id. Throughout this Article, I refer to custodial parents as mothers and non-custodial parents/child 
support obligors as fathers.  While the number of single fathers who serve as custodians for children is 
increasing, the vast majority of children in single parent families are in single mother households. SIMMONS 
AND O’NEILL, supra note 3. See also, Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Motherhood: Conflicting 
Definitions from Welfare “Reform,” Family, and Criminal Law, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 688, 708 (1998).
6fathers of children receiving public benefits, welfare-driven child support policies are 
pushing those fathers to seek disestablishment of paternity.  In resolving these claims, 
courts and legislatures are reinstating a construct of paternal functions defined almost 
exclusively in economic terms and a definition of fatherhood grounded in biology that 
ignores other potential bases for fatherhood-based caretaking.21  As a result, children are 
becoming fatherless and the state’s interests in collecting child support, preserving 
families, and protecting children are undermined by the very laws designed to protect 
those interests. 
The connections between welfare reform and the legal construct of fatherhood are 
complex and have not been fully explored.22  They have, however, profound implications 
for the future of children and families.  Part One of this Article briefly reviews the law’s 
historical approach to defining fatherhood.  Part Two explores the connection between 
the evolving definition of fatherhood based exclusively on biology and developments 
over the last three decades in welfare and child support law.23  The Article concludes with 
21 See notes 180-83 infra and accompanying text.
22
 Much scholarship analyzing the changes in child support in the early 1990’s, including the author’s, 
focused on how to make the new child support bureaucracy more effective in collecting support.  See e.g., 
Jane C. Murphy, Eroding the Myth of Discretionary Justice in Family Law: The Child Support Experiment, 
70 N.C.L. REV. 209, 226-231 (1991) (arguing that the move from discretion to rule-based child support 
guidelines with enhanced enforcement is much needed reform for custodial mothers and children.); Marsha 
Garrison, Child Support and Children’s Poverty, 28 FAM. L.Q. 475, 479-81 (1994); Essentials of Child 
Support Guideline Development: Economic Issues and Policy Considerations, Women’s Legal Defense 
Fund (1987).  But a few scholars and researchers saw the risks of unintended consequences of the new 
directions in welfare and child support policy as early as a decade ago.  David L. Chambers, Fathers, the 
Welfare System, and the Virtues and Perils of Child-Support Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REV. 2575, 2577 
(1995) (discussing a suspicion “that although improved enforcement programs would likely produce 
substantial positive results for many women and children, they would also, for a substantial and 
immeasurable number of men, women and children, inflict unintended and undesirable harms that we 
would regret.  As is often true in our society, these negative consequences would be borne 
disproportionately by the poorest persons and by persons of color.”); Sara S. McLanahan, The 
Consequences of Single Motherhood, Am. Prospect, Summer 1994, at 48, 57 (recognizing the risks of 
“stricter” child support enforcement on the poor).
23
 In this section and elsewhere in this Article, I use the terms “child support reform” and “welfare reform” 
interchangeably.  This reflects the fact that since the early 1970’s child support collection has been 
inextricably linked to the goal of reducing welfare costs. See e.g., Tonya L. Brito, The Welfarization of 
7some preliminary suggestions for shaping policies that balance the need for appropriate 
child support enforcement with the overarching goal of keeping fathers in children’s 
lives. 
I. Historical Definitions of Fatherhood
The law’s definition of fatherhood has evolved over time.  The common law 
principle that fatherhood would only be recognized within marriage remained the law 
until the late 20th century when the law began to recognize unmarried fathers based on 
biology, caretaking or both.  This modern expanded definition of fatherhood has been 
challenged by developments in the law in the last decade. As welfare costs have soared, 
the federal government has increased its powers to recover these costs from putative 
fathers, particularly low-income men, through aggressive paternity establishment and 
child support enforcement policies. In response, these men have sought to defend against 
incarceration and other sanctions for failing to pay child support by questioning the 
legitimacy of paternity orders established without genetic testing. The state legislatures 
and courts have answered these paternity disestablishment efforts by reverting to a 
narrow definition of fatherhood which is based solely on biology and which limits  
fathers’ role under the law to that of breadwinner.  This shift, based upon flawed 
assumptions about the value of linking child support and welfare, has dramatic and 
negative implications for families, especially children. 
. 
Family Law, 48 KAN. L. REV. 229, 254 (1999) (“The history of child support law represents a literal 
joining of family law and welfare law. The original child support program was limited to families receiving 
[welfare] because, quite simply, the government wanted to recoup welfare costs through child support 
collection.”)
8A. Fathers as Husbands:  The Marital Presumption
The presumption that the husband of a married woman is the father of 
any children born to that woman was a fundamental principle at common law.24  Dating 
back to Roman law, the presumption was conclusive unless the husband was sterile, 
impotent or had no access to his wife during the relevant time period prior to birth.25
Non-access could only be proven by testimony from third parties26 that “the husband be 
out of the kingdom of England”. . .  for above nine months.27 The marital presumption 
remained “one of the strongest presumptions known to law” in 18th and 19th century 
England and America.28
There are two principle policy justifications for the marital presumption.  The first 
is to protect children from the stigma and legal disabilities resulting from illegitimacy.29
An illegitimate child was considered to be no one’s child.30 This social stigma was 
reinforced by prevailing religious and legal principles that held that “all progeny not 
begotten” in a marriage were unlawful.31  The child of unmarried parents had no right of 
24 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1 at *459.
25 H. NICHOLAS, ADULTERIVE BASTARDY 1 (1836).
26
 This rule of evidence provided that neither the husband nor the wife could be a witness to prove access or 
non-access where the effect of such testimony would result in the illegitimacy of a child.  This rule is 
generally referred to as Lord Mansfield’s rule.  HOMER CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN 
THE UNITED STATES, 544 (2d ed. 1988). Lord Mansfield described the evidentiary conclusion as “a rule, 
founded in decency, morality, and policy, that [the husband and wife] shall not be permitted to say after 
marriage. . .that the offspring is spurious. . ..”  Goodright v. Moss, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257, 1258 (K.B. 1777).
27
 The so-called “beyond the four seas” doctrine is described in Blackstone’s Commentaries at page 456.
28 See, e.g., Espree v. Guillory, 753 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. App. 1988).
29
 This policy justification may be viewed as somewhat circular given that the rationale for the legal 
disabilities suffered by children deemed “illegitimate” was to protect the sanctity of marriage and punish 
the immorality of parents who gave birth outside of marriage. Ayer, Legitimacy and Marriage, 16 HARV. 
L. REV. 22, 37 (1902).
30
 Martha T. Zingo & Kevin E. Early, Nameless Persons (1994); See also, HARRY D. KRAUSE, 
ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 3 (1971).
31 W. HOOPER, THE LAW OF ILLEGITIMACY 3 (1911).  Social stigma from illegitimacy may have been 
greater in the United States than England due to the reign of William the Conqueror, “who made no effort 
to disguise his illegitimate origin and frequently referred to himself as William the Bastard.” Mary Kay 
Kisthardt, Fatherhood, Families and Fantasy: The Legacy of Michael H. & Gerald D., 65 TULANE L. REV.
585, 588 (1991).
9inheritance or succession.32 Unmarried biological fathers had neither an obligation to pay 
child support nor custodial rights to their children.33 Thus, when mothers died or were 
unable to care for children, nonmarital children were often wards of the state.
The marital presumption was also justified as necessary to protect the sanctity of 
the most protected unit under Anglo-American family law, the marital family.34 By 
preventing the possibility that either spouse would testify to establish a third party had 
fathered a child with the wife, the “peace and tranquility of states and families” were 
preserved.35  As discussed in an 18th century English case, “It is a rule founded in 
decency, morality and policy that [the husband and wife] shall not be permitted to say 
after marriage that they have had no connection and therefore that the offspring is 
spurious; more especially the mother who is the offending party.”36
The common law rules on fatherhood also reflected the view that “the father-child 
relationship was primarily an economic one.”37  The rights and responsibilities that 
attached to legal – i.e. marital – fathers were primarily economic in nature. Married 
fathers had an obligation to provide financial support and children of married fathers 
could inherit from them.  In turn, marital children were viewed as property and fathers 
32
 2 KENT’S COMMENTARIES 175 (1827).
33
 While no legal support claim could be brought for these children under the common law, ecclesiastical 
courts might hold biological fathers responsible for the economic support of their illegitimate children. See
generally R.H. Helmholz, Support Orders, Church Courts, and the Rule of Filius Nullius: A Reassessment 
of the Common Law, 63 VA. L. REV. 431 (1977).
34 See e.g., MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH 
CENTURY AMERICA (1985); Alison Harvison Young, Reconceiving the Family: Challenging the Paradigm 
of the Exclusive Family, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL. & L. 505 (1998).
35 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 125 (1989), quoting J. SCHOULER, LAW OF DOMESTIC 
RELATIONS § 225 at 306 (1882).  
36
 Goodright, 98 ENG. REP. AT 1258.
37
 Kisthardt, supra note 31 at 588; See also, James Kent, Commentaries on American Law, reprinted in 1 
CHILD AND YOUTH IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 363 (Robert H. Bremner ed., 1970).
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were entitled to their labor, and, later, after the Industrial Revolution, to the earnings of
their children.38
B. Unmarried and “Defacto” Fathers: Adding Biology and Caretaking as 
Alternative Bases for Fatherhood
In practice, then, the marital presumption limited legal fathers to married men.
If a child’s mother was married, her husband, with few exceptions, was viewed as the 
father.  If a child was born to an unmarried woman, the child had no father.39  In either 
circumstance, unmarried biological fathers were not recognized under the law.  This rigid 
system that narrowly defined fatherhood by status began to change as the social, 
demographic and scientific supports for the system eroded.  First, the numbers of 
nonmarital births in this country increased dramatically in the last three decades of the 
20th century.40  At the same time, the legal distinction between legitimate and illegitimate 
children began to be stricken from the law on constitutional grounds.41  Finally, science’s 
ability to determine biological fatherhood improved dramatically.42  All of these 
38 See Jamil S. Zainaldin, The Emergence of a Modern American Family Law: Child Custody, Adoption, 
and the Courts, 1796-1851, 73 NW. U. L. REV. 1038, 1064-68 (1979).
39
 Biological fathers had no right of action at common law to bring a paternity suit.  See, e.g., Baker v. 
State, 14 N.W. 718, 719 (Wis. 1883).
40The rapid growth in the illegitimacy rate did not begin until 1970 when it went from 11% of births in 
1970 to 30% in 1991. Gertrude Himmelfarb, A De-Moralized Society: The British/American Experience, 
THE PUB. INT., Sept. 22, 1994, at 57.  The nonmarital birth rate has remained relatively stable since 1990.  
Child Trends, Facts at a Glance, 2 (November 2003) at childtrends.org/Files/FAAG2003.pdf. When 
illegitimacy rates are broken down by race, the picture is somewhat different.  For white children the ratio 
went up from 1.5 percent to a little over 2 percent between 1920 and 1960, and then advanced at an even 
steeper rate than that of blacks: to almost 6 percent in 1970, 11 percent in 1980, and nearly 22 percent in 
1991.  The black illegitimacy ratio did not accelerate as much because it started at a higher level:  from 12 
percent in 1920 to 22 percent in 1960, over 37 percent in 1970, 55 percent in 1980, and 68 percent by 1991.  
Id. at 3-4.  See also Cynthia Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common Law Marriage, 75 OR. 
L. REV. 709, 737-734 (1996) (discussing the cultural and legal impediments to formal marriage among both 
African-Americans and poor white populations in the U.S. in the 18th and 19th century.); See also, NIH, 
Proceedings from the Conference on Counting Couples: Improving Marriage, Divorce, Remarriage, and 
Cohabitation Data in the Federal Statistical System (2001), available at
http://www.childstats.gov/countingcou. 
41 CLARK, supra note 26 at 155-172.
42
 Two common paternity tests are human leukocyte antigen (HLA) tissue typing paternity testing and 
DNA fingerprinting.  See Deborah A. Ellingboe, Sex, Lies, and Genetic Tests:  Challenging the Marital 
11
circumstances led to two developments in the last half of the 20th century that resulted in 
the expansion of both the legal definition of father and the perceived functions of 
fatherhood: 1) a weakening of the marital presumption and 2) a recognition that 
unmarried biological fathers have constitutionally protected relationships with their 
children.  
While marriage continues to play an important role in defining fatherhood, the 
marital presumption has weakened in the last quarter century.43 Although the nature of 
the evidence necessary to rebut the presumption varies widely, putative unmarried fathers 
can become “legal” fathers in a number of states by presenting evidence of both the 
biologic connection to the child and the extent of the relationship they have established 
with the child.44
For fathers of nonmarital children, changes in the law have also resulted in legal 
recognition based on both biology and caretaking functions.  In a series of decisions 
beginning in the 1970’s, the United States Supreme Court recognized 1) that unmarried 
Presumption of Paternity Under the Minnesota Parentage Act, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1013, 1015 n.12 (1994). 
Although invasive HLA tissue typing can provide up to 98% probability of paternity, see id., buccal swab 
DNA testing has become the most common method of determining paternity due to its noninvasiveness and 
near positive paternity identification.  FORENSIC PATERNITY TESTING NEWSLETTER (April 2003), at 
http://www.divorcenet.com/newsletter03/fptn008.html.  Buccal swab testing, which does not require lab 
technicians to collect, is available through home test kits provided by online services with turnaround times 
as minimal as 3-5 days for costs ranging from $205 - $575. Id.; SwabTest, Bringing You the World of 
Genetics, at http://www.swabtest.com/.  Legal DNA testing, due to the necessary chain of custody, requires 
collection by appointment at a testing facility.  Gene Tree DNA Testing Center, DNA Paternity Testing for 
Legal Purposes, at http://www.genetree.com/product/dna-legaltests.asp.
43 See Theresa Glennon, Somebody’s Child: Evaluating the Erosion of the Marital Presumption of 
Paternity, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 547, 566-571 (2000);  Note, Rebutting the Marital Presumption: A 
Developed Relationship Test, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 374 (1988).
44
 The marital presumption can now be challenged in many states by the mother, husband, and the child.  
See, e.g., IND. CODE § 31-9-2-35.5 (2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270 (Michie 2002); MINN. STAT. § 
257C.01 (2003) (as amended by 2003 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 7 (S.F. 356) (West)). But such challenges 
are often unsuccessful when subjected to a “best interests of the child” test.  See note 178 infra. A sharply 
divided United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a strong marital presumption statute in 
Michael H. v. Gerald D., supra note 2.  A few years later, however, California joined the majority trend 
and amended and weakened its marital presumption statute. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (2002). 
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fathers have legal rights and 2) the functions of fatherhood go beyond economic 
support.45
In the 1972 decision Stanley v. Illinois,46 the United States Supreme Court 
considered the rights of Peter Stanley who had lived with Joan Stanley and their children 
in an unmarried relationship for 18 years.  When Joan  Stanley died, Illinois, like most 
states at that time, did not recognize Stanley as the father and the children were declared 
wards of the state and placed in the custody of guardians.  In holding that Illinois’s statute 
violated both the guarantees of due process and equal protection, the Court found that 
Stanley’s biological and caretaking commitment to his children entitled him to be 
recognized as their father under the law. 47 The Court further held that because unmarried 
fathers have a “liberty interest” in their continued relationship with children they had 
“sired and raised,” the state must afford them an opportunity to establish their fitness 
prior to the children’s removal.48
Three decisions following Stanley reaffirmed the principle that an unmarried 
biological father’s efforts to establish a relationship with his children – both as financial 
provider and nurturer– determine whether the law recognizes him as father.  In the 1978 
case Quillion v. Walcott,49 the Supreme Court held that a putative father who had not 
attempted to establish a relationship with his 11-year old child could not prevent the 
child’s adoption by the mother’s husband when that adoption was in the best interests of 
the child.  A year later, in Caban v. Mohammed,50 the Court reaffirmed the connection 
45
 John A. Blum, Can An Unmarried Biological Father Recover Damages?, 2002 UTAH L. REV. 577, 578-
582.
46 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
47 Id. at 658.
48 Id. at 657-58.
49
 434 U.S. 246 (1978). 
50
 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
13
between establishing an ongoing relationship with one’s children and legal recognition of 
fatherhood.  The Court invalidated a New York statute on equal protection grounds that 
precluded an unmarried father from adopting his biological children.  In so doing, the 
Court held that there must be an “established . . . substantial relationship” between the 
unmarried father and the child in order for the father to exercise his rights.51
Finally, in Lehr v. Robertson,52 the Supreme Court found that states can impose a 
time limitation for a putative father to establish a relationship with his nonmarital child.  
The majority resisted the dissent’s position that the biological connection itself was 
enough to create the legally protected status as father.53 Instead, the majority held that 
“the significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural father an 
opportunity . . . to develop a relationship with his offspring.”54
These developments in the law –the weakening of the marital presumption and the 
recognition of the importance of caretaking in Stanley and its progeny– have resulted in 
an expanded legal definition of fatherhood.  Marriage to the child’s mother, a biological 
connection, and an established relationship are all recognized as important elements in 
establishing legal fatherhood.  Not all are required elements of fatherhood, but all are 
recognized as potential bases for establishing legal fatherhood.  By expanding the 
category of men that could be legally recognized as fathers, the law also began to support 
an expanded conception of the functions of fatherhood that goes beyond economic 
51 Id. at 393.
52
 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
53
 Justice White wrote a dissent in Lehr which was joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun.  It was their 
position that the “biological connection” is itself a relationship that creates a protected interest. “Thus the 
‘nature’ of the interest is the parent-child relationship; how well-developed that relationship has become 
goes to its ‘weight,’ not its ‘nature.’  Whether Lehr’s interest is entitled to constitutional protection does not 
entail a searching inquiry into the quality of the relationship but a simple determination of the fact that the 
relationship exists – a fact that even the majority agrees must be assumed to be established.”  Id. at 272.   
54 Id. at 262 (emphasis added).  
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support and includes the important functions connected with nurturing and caring for 
children’s day to day needs.  This re-envisioning of fatherhood has been strengthened by 
other developments in family law that reflect recognition of the importance of the child 
caretaking function of fatherhood.
In the area of custody, one of the first developments of this kind was the 
introduction of the concept of joint custody. The first joint custody statute was passed in 
1979 in California55 and most states eventually followed suit, either by joint custody 
statutes or through case law.56  While many scholars have critiqued the implementation of 
joint custody statutes,57 the enactment of such statutes reflects a legal recognition of 
father’s roles as caretakers of their children.  
55 See Legislative History of CAL. FAM. CODE § 3080.
56 About 41 states and the District of Columbia have statutes authorizing courts to order joint or shared 
custody.  Of these 41, 29 authorize the court to order joint custody but do not require it. ALA. CODE § 30-3-
152(a) (1998), ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.060 (Michie 2002), ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403(B) (West 
Supp. 2003), ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-101(B)(1)(A) (Michie Supp. 2003), COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-
10-124(b) (West 1996), DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 13 §§ 722 & 727 (1999), HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46.1 
(1993), 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/602.1(b) (West 1993), IND. CODE ANN. § 31-17-2-13 (Michie 2003),
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270 (Michie 2003), LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:335 (West 1999), MD. CODE 
ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-203(d) (Supp. 2004), MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 31 (West Supp. 2004), 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.26a (West 2002), MO. ANN. STAT. § 452.375 (West 2002), NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 42-364(5) (Supp. 2004), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4 (West 2002), N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2 (2003), 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 109(B) (West 2001), OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(2) (West Supp. 2004), 
OR. REV. STAT. § 107.105 (2003), 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5304 (West 2001), S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 
25-5-7.1 (Michie 1999), TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-101(a)(1) (Supp. 2003), UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10.2 
(Supp. 2004), VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 665(a) (2002), VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.2(B) (Michie 2004), W. 
VA. CODE ANN. § 48-9-207(a) (Michie 2001), WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-201 (Michie 2003).  Twelve states 
and the District of Columbia have some form of presumption in favor of joint custody.  CAL. FAM. CODE § 
3080 (West 1994), CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56a (West 2003), D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-914(a)(2) 
(Supp. 2004), FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(2)(b) (2004), IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41 (West 2000), KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 60-1610(a)(4) (1994), ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A § 1653(2) (West Supp. 2003), MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 518.17(2) (West Supp. 2004), MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24(4) (Supp. 2003), NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 125.490 (Michie 2004), N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458.17 (Supp. 2003), N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1 
(Michie 1999), WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.24 (2) (West Supp. 2003).  Nine states do not have statutes but can 
order joint custody under the courts’ general equitable powers. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-1 (2004), IDAHO 
CODE § 32-717 (Michie 1996), MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212 (2003), N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240 
(McKinney Supp. 2004), N.D. CENT. CODE §14-09-06 (2003), R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16 (2003), S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 20-3-160 (Law. Co-op. 1984), TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152 (Vernon 2001), WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 26.09.002 (West 1996).
57 See, e.g., Gerald W. Hardcastle, Joint Custody: A Family Court Judge’s Perspective, 32 FAM. L. Q. 201 
(1998) (arguing that studies supporting joint custody are misleading because research tools are flawed and 
the ultimate success of a joint custody arrangement depends upon cooperation between the parents); 
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Another development over the last decade that has promoted involvement of 
fathers in children’s lives when parents live apart is the growing use of court ordered 
“parenting classes” in custody cases which emphasize the importance of both parents in 
the caretaking of children.58 “Parenting plans” also promote the involvement of fathers in 
child rearing by requiring the parties to delineate each parent’s responsibilities for the 
care of the children and decisions about education, health care, discipline and 
education.59 About ten states and the District of Columbia currently require parties to 
submit proposed parenting plans prior to a grant of custody. Another eight states have 
statutes that give judges discretion to require parenting plans in custody cases.60
Margaret M. Barry, The District of Columbia’s Joint Custody Presumption: Misplaced Blame and 
Simplistic Solutions, 46 CATH. U.L. REV. 767 (1997) (arguing in favor of resolving custody issues through 
agreements made by parents, rather than by the imposition of joint custody by courts).
58 AFCC DIRECTORY OF PARENT EDUCATION PROGRAMS (2000) (providing brief program 
descriptions and contact people for parenting education classes). See also, Peter Salem et al., Special Issue: 
Parent Education in  Divorce and Separation,  34 FAM. & CONCILIATION REV. No. 1 (1996).
59 See Francis J. Cantania, Jr., Learning From the Process of Decision: The Parenting Plan, 2001 BYU L. 
Rev. 857 (2001); Don R. Ash, Adoption and Custody Law in Tennessee, 22 MEMPHIS ST. LAW. R. 769, 
804-805 (1997)
60 ALA. CODE § 30-3-153 (1995) amended by Pub. L. No. 96-520 (1996) (requiring parents in joint custody 
cases to submit a plan regarding the care and custody of the child); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403(F) 
(West Supp. 2003) (before a court awards joint custody, parents must submit a proposed parenting plan); 
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/602.1(b) (1993) (in cases where a court considers an award of joint custody, 
the court requests that the parents produce a Joint Parenting Agreement specifying each parent’s powers, 
rights and responsibilities regarding the child); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 31 (West Supp. 2003) 
(“At the trial on the merits, if…either party seeks shared legal or physical custody, the parties, jointly or 
individually, shall submit…a shared custody implementation plan.”); MO. ANN. STAT. § 452.375(9) (2002) 
(“any judgment providing for joint custody shall include a specific written parenting plan setting forth the 
terms of such parenting plan arrangements… Such plan may be a parenting plan submitted by the 
parties…or, in the absence thereof, a plan determined by the court…the custody plan approved and ordered 
by the court shall be in the court’s discretion and shall be in the best interest of the child.”); MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 40-4-234(1) (2003) (“In every dissolution proceeding, proceeding for declaration of invalidity of 
marriage, parenting plan proceeding, or legal separation that involves a child, each parent or both parents 
jointly shall submit…a proposed final plan for parenting the child…”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1(F) 
(Michie 1999) (prior to the award of joint custody, a court shall approve a parenting plan (including 
division of child’s time and care between parents) for the implementation of the custody arrangement); 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 109(C) (West 2001) (“If either or both parents have requested joint custody, 
said parents shall file their plans for the exercise of joint care, custody and control of their child.”); WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.181 (West1996) (“In any proceeding…each party shall file and serve a proposed 
permanent parenting plan”).  But see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 727 (1999) (the court may grant temporary 
joint or sole custody for up to six months to allow the parents the opportunity to show the court they are 
willing and able to cooperate with the custody order).
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A new standard for resolving custody disputes proposed by a group of academics, 
judges and lawyers from the American Law Institute (ALI) has also contributed to an 
expanded definition of fatherhood that, in some instances, places caretaking on the same 
level as marriage and biology in establishing parental rights.61  The ALI proposes a 
substantive standard for custody that limits the court’s ability to resort to parental 
stereotypes, shifting the paradigm in custody cases from parents to children.62  Instead of 
asking which parent has deviated from the prescribed role,63 the new approach states that 
a child’s best interest is served by “continuing existing parent-child attachments” and 
giving responsibility to “adults who love the child, know how to provide for the child’s 
needs, and place a high priority on doing so.”64
A number of scholars have also made the case for legal recognition of “de 
facto” parents by challenging the law’s adherence to the concept of exclusive parenthood 
based on marriage or biology.65  Katharine Bartlett, one of the first to advocate for “non-
exclusive parenthood,” argues that when the nuclear family has broken down, children 
should have “the opportunity to maintain important familial relationships with more than 
one parent or set of parents . . . in the growing range of circumstances in which these 
61 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, § 2.18 A.L.I. 
(2002). 
62
 ALI Principles use terms “custodial and decisionmaking responsibility” rather than physical and legal 
custody. Id. at § 2.03(3)-(4).
63
 For a review of child custody cases in which courts relied on the father as breadwinner and mother as 
nurturer stereotypes, see Murphy, supra note 20, at 696-99.
64 Id.; § 218 A.L.I. (2002).
65
 An early explanation of the importance of the defacto or psychological parent is found in the landmark 
work of psychologists, Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud and Alfred Solnit: “Whether any adult becomes the 
psychological parent of a child is based thus on day-to-day interaction, companionship, and shared 
experiences. The role can be fulfilled either by a biological parent or by an adoptive parent or by any other 
caring adult – but never by an absent, inactive adult, whatever his biological or legal relationship to the 
child may be.” JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD, 17-20 (1973).
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relationships are formed outside the nuclear family.”66  Other scholars have argued for a 
more expansive view of non-exclusive parenthood, advocating for a “rewriting of the 
definition of the family.”67  Under these proposals, the law’s recognition of adults who 
have assumed one or more parental roles is not predicated on the breakdown of the 
child’s parents’ marriage.  These scholars reject the privileged status of the nuclear 
family, finding it insufficient to meet the needs of children.68  Instead, these proposals 
envision a broader, more fluid family network, that one scholar has called “webs of 
care.”69
While these proposals for non-exclusive parenthood vary in the criteria that 
trigger legal recognition of caretakers, they all place caring for the child as the condition 
for such recognition.  Thus, they replace biology and, in most instances, marriage, with a 
functional definition of parenthood.  They offer a theoretical framework that 
appropriately challenges the “all or nothing” biology-based definition of fatherhood
emerging from the paternity disestablishment cases. 
The work of scholars arguing against exclusive parenthood is also reflected in the 
ALI Principles which accord legal protection to “social” or “functional” fathers and 
66
 Bartlett, supra note 2, at 882-883. See also, William C. Duncan, Don’t Ever Take a Fence Down: The 
Functional Definition of Family – Displacing Marriage in Family Law, 3 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 57 (2001); 
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parental Rights, 14 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1747, 1754-57(1993) (arguing that the biological mother’s unmarried partner who cared 
for mother and child throughout pregnancy and early childhood should be given legal parental status).
67
 Matthew M Kavanagh, Rewriting the Legal Family: Beyond Exclusivity to a Care-Based Standard, 16 
YALE J. L. & FEMINISM, 83, 143 (2004). See also, Alison HarvisonYoung, supra note 34, Gilbert Holmes, 
The Tie That Binds: The Constitutional Right of Children to Maintain Relationships with Parent-Like 
Individuals, 53 MD. L. REV. 358 (1994); Leslie Joan Harris, Reconsidering the Criteria for Legal 
Fatherhood, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 461 (1996).
68
 Kavanagh, supra note 67, at 93; Young, supra note 34, at 512-13.
69
 Kavanagh, supra note 67, at 137; Young, supra note 34, at 516-18; While recognizing the need for 
placing decision-making authority for children in a “core family unit,” these proposals recognize that 
parental roles may be allocated among several adults and argue that the law should recognize multiple 
caretakers.
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others similarly situated.70  In addition to legal parents, the ALI recognizes parents “by 
estoppel.”  A parent by estoppel is a person who acts as a parent in circumstances that 
would estop the child’s legal parent from denying the claimant’s parental status.  Parent-
by-estoppel status is created when an individual (1) is obligated for child support, or (2) 
has lived with the child for at least two years and has a reasonable belief that he is the 
father, or (3) has had an agreement with the child’s legal parent since birth (or for at least 
two years) to serve as a co-parent, provided that recognition of parental status would 
serve the child’s best interest.71  Both legal parents and parents by estoppel are entitled to 
presumptive allocations of custodial and decision-making responsibility.72
Building on the work of researchers and scholars, legislatures and judges have 
also begun to give increased recognition to “functional” parents when deciding custody 
and visitation cases.  Over the last three decades, a few states73 and a handful of courts74
70
 ALI Principles supra note 61 §2.21(1). The ALI, courts and legislatures use a variety of terms to describe 
an individual who has, based on caretaking over a period of time, formed a strong bond with a child. The 
terms include “de facto,” “social,” “functional,” or “psychological” parent.  While these terms may have 
slightly different meanings attributed by different scholars or courts, they are used interchangeably 
throughout this Article.
71
 ALI Principles §2.03(1)(b)(2002).
72
 ALI Principles §2.09(1)(a) and §2.10(b). §2.10(4)The Principles also recognize “defacto parents.” Under 
the ALI, a defacto parent is a person, other than a legal parent or parent by estoppel, who has regularly 
performed an equal or greater share of caretaking as the parent with whom the child primarily lived, lived 
with the child for a significant period (not less than two years), and acted as a parent for non-financial 
reasons (and with the agreement of a legal parent) or as a result of a complete failure or inability of any 
legal parent to perform caretaking functions. Id. at §2.03(1)(c). While a defacto parent may acquire some 
parental rights, the Principles still privilege the legal parent’s rights over the defacto parent’s. A defacto 
parent is precluded from receiving a majority of custodial responsibility for the child if a legal parent or a 
parent by estoppel is fit and willing to care for the child (§2.18(1)(a)). Similarly, a defacto parent’s rights 
may be limited or denied if the custodial allocation would be impractical in light of the number of other 
adults to be allocated custodial responsibility (§2.18(1)(b)).
73 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 109.119 (2001) (granting rights to “a person who establishes emotional ties 
creating child-parent relationship or ongoing personal relationship”); WIS. STAT. § 767.245 (2001) 
(granting rights to a person who “maintained a relationship similar to a parent-child relationship”). 
74 Matter of J.C., 184 Misc.2d 935 (2000); V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000) (granting visitation to 
the lesbian co-parent of twins but denying joint custody); Weinand v. Weinand, 616 N.W.2d 1 (Neb. 2000) 
(granting visitation rights to former stepparent); In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995) 
(where a non-biological parent proves she has a parent-like relationship with a child, a court may grant 
visitation if it is in the best interests of the child); Seger v. Seger, 547 A.2d 424 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) 
(granting partial custody and visitation rights to non-biological father who was married to child’s mother 
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have granted non-biological, non-marital caretakers such as stepfathers or partners in 
same sex relationships rights similar to those granted legal fathers.  While most of these 
statutes and decisions continued to distinguish between legal parents and third parties, 
they are a step toward recognition of social fatherhood in that rights are accorded based 
on the adult’s caretaking relationship to the child rather than the adult’s biological 
status.75 As one leading family court trial judge commented:
Biology is not always determinative of a man’s role in the life of a child.  
When I examine the ultimate issue of what is in the child’s best interest, 
I have found that a biological connection is not necessarily required for 
a paternal link to grow between the man and the child.  At the same time, 
while there may be a biological tie, biology alone does not make a good 
father.76
Thus, by the late 20th century, the law had begun to recognize men as fathers 
based on marriage, biology, caretaking or some combination of these.  These legal 
developments supported a view that fathers have a rich, complex role in their children’s 
and assumed the role of child’s father for eight years); Paquette v. Paquette, 499 A.2d 23 (Vt. 1985) (a 
stepparent standing in loco parentis may be awarded custody of a non-biological child if he shows that the 
natural parent is unfit or that extraordinary circumstances exist and that it’s in the best interests of the 
child); Carter v. Broderick, 644 P.2d 850 (Alaska 1982) (finding that the legislature intended to allow third 
party visitation and that where a stepparent is in loco parentis, a stepchild is considered a “child of the 
marriage”); Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1978) (holding that a stepfather had a right to a hearing 
to determine whether he stood in loco parentis to his stepchild and whether it was in the child’s best interest 
to have visitation with his stepfather). While these cases generally limit the parental rights to visitation, 
some courts have extended custodial rights to defacto parents  R.E.M. v. S.L.V., No. FD-15-748-98N (N.J. 
Ocean County Super. Ct. Nov. 2, 1998) (awarding non-biological mother both visitation and joint legal 
custody); J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314, 1322 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (finding that nonlegal parent may 
have standing to seek partial custody of biological child of former lesbian partner if she can establish that 
she stood in loco parentis to child during relationship); See also, Robyn Cheryl Miller, Child Custody and 
Visitation Rights for Non-Biological “Parents”: Analyzing V.C. v. M.J.B., N.J. LAW MAG., Feb. 2001, at 
17.
75
 The United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), endorsing 
the common law tradition of autonomy for legal parents, may be seen as a statement in the opposite 
direction.  However, the Troxel Court clearly supported continued legal recognition of nonparents based on 
its assumption of caretaking duties for the children.  Id. at 64.
76
 The Honorable Sharon S. Townsend, Fatherhood: A Judicial Perspective, Unmarried Fathers and the 
Changing Role of the Family Court, FAM. CT. REV., Vol. 41 No. 3, July 2003 354-361.
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lives.  This role includes not only financial support but also the emotional and physical 
support that comes from ongoing connection and care.  
II.          Fatherhood as Biology and Economic Support:  The Impact of Child 
             Support Enforcement and Welfare Reform on Fatherhood
A. Child Support and Welfare Reform
Against a backdrop of laws expanding view of fatherhood, welfare and related 
child support policies have pushed the law in the opposite direction.  Three decades of 
welfare “reform” have resulted in policies that threaten to limit the meaning of 
fatherhood to biology and financial support. While the primary goal of modern child 
support law was to reduce welfare costs,77 many hoped improved child support collection 
would reduce poverty in low income custodial households.78   These efforts, however, 
have had a number of unintended consequences that adversely impact low income 
families, particularly the relationship between fathers and children in those families.
The connection between legal recognition of fatherhood and welfare law begins 
with the requirement that custodial parents – overwhelmingly mothers – seeking public 
benefits for their children must identify the fathers of those children.79  The principle that 
non-custodial parents should reimburse the state for its costs in supporting their children 
has been in place since the beginning of the child support “revolution” in the mid-
77 See, e.g., Ann Estin, Moving Beyond the Child Support Revolution, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 505 (2001) 
(“Much of the motivation for the enormous national effort and expense devoted to the child support 
revolution was the promise that better support enforcement would help keep single-parent families off the 
welfare rolls and allow the government to recoup its growing expenditures for public benefits”).  See also,
Brito, supra note 23 at 250-51, 259.
78 See note 22 supra.
79
 The overwhelming majority of children who live with only one parent live with their mothers. [cite] This 
article follows rhetoric and reality of welfare reform in assuming the named welfare recipient is a mother 
caring for children and the child support obligor who the state looks to for reimbursement is the father. 
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1970s.80  In 1974, Congress enacted Title IV-D of the Social Security Act which created 
the Child Support Enforcement Act and established the Federal Office of Child Support 
Enforcement.81  The Act required welfare recipients to assign their rights to child support 
to the state82 to offset welfare costs of the federal government.  Because identifying the 
non-custodial parent is the initial step in child support enforcement,83 welfare recipients 
were required to cooperate in identifying the non-custodial parent.84
In response to exceedingly low child support collection awards85 and a belief that 
a “lack of a strong child support enforcement system contributed to child poverty and 
welfare dependency,”86 Congress enacted more rigorous enforcement tools in the Child 
Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984,87 requiring that states create fixed formulae 
for establishing the level of child support and impose sanctions such as income 
withholding, for child support obligors who fail to comply with child support orders.88
80 D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW, 763 (2002) (describing child 
support enforcement techniques as having “undergone a revolution in recent decades as a result of federal 
involvement”). For a complete history of the “federalization” of child support, see Cahn & Murphy, infra 
note 108.
81 FAMILY SUPPORT ACT, PUB. L. NO. 93-647, TITLE IV-D, 88 STAT. 2348 (1974) (CODIFIED AS 42 U.S.C. § 
651-70 (1994)).  The Act created a partnership between federal and state government wherein each state 
administered child support enforcement programs under the direction of federal policy and was reimbursed 
for a portion of the enforcement expenditures.  ELAINE SORENSON, MARK TURNER, NATIONAL CENTER ON 
FATHERS AND FAMILIES, BARRIERS IN CHILD SUPPORT POLICY: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE (1995), 
http://www.ncoff.gse.upenn.edu/litrev/sblr.htm.
82 42 U.S.C. 602(A)(26) (current version as amended codified at 42 U.S.C. § 608(A)(3) (1999).
83 E. WATTENBERG, PATERNITY ACTIONS AND YOUNG FATHERS – YOUNG UNWED FATHERS: CHANGING 
ROLES AND EMERGING POLICIES (1993).
84
 42 U.S.C. § 654 (29)(A)(West 2002) (requiring that, as a condition for receiving child support, a parent 
must provide the name “and such other information as the state may require” with respect to the 
noncustodial parent.)
85
 The average child support award in 1983 was $2,521. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
COMMERCE, Series P-23, No. 148, Child Support and Alimony: 1983 (Supplemental Report) 10 Table G 
(1986). A conservative estimate of annual expenditures that could have been expected to be made on behalf 
of two children in a two-parent, medium income family in 1983 was $10,028. Thomas J. Espenshade, 
Investing in Children: New Estimates of Parental Expenditures 3 Washington D.C.: Urban Institute Press 
(1984) (Espenshade’s 1981 estimates updated to 1983 dollars using the Consumer Price Index).
86 SORENSEN AND TURNER, supra note 81.
87
 Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub.L.No. 98-378 (1984), § 18(b) (current version as 
amended codified at 42 U.S.C. § 667(A)(2001).
88 Id.
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Four years later, Congress passed the Family Support Act of 1988,89 which 
marked the real beginning of making paternity establishment the cornerstone of the 
modern child support and welfare system.90 Prior to this federal legislation, the state was 
relatively uninvolved in establishment of paternity, leaving the resolution of the issue to 
parents.91 This Act requires that each state establish a minimum number of paternity 
declarations or face financial penalties.92 The Act also allowed for, but did not require, 
genetic testing in contested paternity cases and imposed time limits for states to process 
paternity cases.93
Congress continued the push to increase and streamline paternity establishment 
when it enacted the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993.94  Noting that the “first 
step in securing child support is the establishment of paternity,”95 the Act mandated, 
among other things, that states “develop a simple administrative process for voluntarily 
acknowledging paternity and requiring that these procedures be available in hospitals.”96
89
 Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 485, 102 Stat. 2343 (current version codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
666-67(2001).
90
 “[Paternity establishment] may be considered the foundation of the [Child Support Enforcement] 
program. To improve the lives of children, one of [the] major goals is to increase paternity establishment 
rates for those children born outside of marriage.” Hearing on Oversight of the Child Support Enforcement 
Program Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, (Sept. 23, 
1999) (Statement of Honorable Olivia A. Golden, Assistant Secretary for Children and Families).
91
 Prior to the federal push, paternity was established for only one-third of non-marital children born each 
year.  Brito, supra note 23 at 259.
92
 D. Meyer, Paternity and Public Policy: Findings, Policy Issues, and Future Research Needs; Paternity 
Establishment: A Public Policy Conference. Vol. 1: Overview, History, and Current Practice, Institute for 
Research on Poverty Special Report. University of Wisconsin (Aug. 1992).
93
 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(B)(i).
94
 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 4301(a), 107 Stat. 312, 372 
(1993) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021, 1144, 1169 (1994)).
95
 Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (1993); Charlotte L. Allen, Federalization of Child Support: Twenty 
Years and Counting, 73 MICH. B.J. 660, 661 (1994).
96
 42 U.S.C. §666(a)(5)(C)(ii).
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More aggressive performance standards for establishing paternity were also included in 
the 1993 statute.97
In 1996 Congress launched its most comprehensive effort “to end welfare as we 
know it”98 and enacted the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act (PRWORA).99  This law affects nearly every aspect of child support services, 
particularly paternity establishment.  To further facilitate paternity establishment, the Act 
requires states to permit paternity establishment at any time before a child is 18 years 
old.100  States were again mandated to simplify the process for voluntary paternity 
acknowledgment, including procedures enacting a program based in hospitals and other 
designated sites.101 States risk federal penalties unless they meet the ultimate goal of 
paternity establishment in 90% of welfare cases statewide.102
Under PRWORA, the state is only required to provide genetic testing upon 
request and in certain contested cases.103  To further encourage paternity establishment, 
the Act strengthened the “cooperation requirement” in which a mother seeking public 
assistance must aid in identifying the father of the child.104 Failure of women to cooperate 
97 Compare P.L. 100-485 § 111(a)(1988) with  P.L. 103-665 103721 (1993) (current version as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 652(g)(1999)).
98
 While PRWORA was soundly criticized by advocates for the poor for its caps on eligibility for benefits, 
the emphasis on streamlining paternity establishment was largely ignored. Paul Legler, The Coming 
Revolution in Child Support Policy: Implications of the 1996 Welfare Act, 30 FAM. L.Q. 519, 526, n.42. 
For an analysis of the context of the political support for PRWORA, see Peter Edelman, The Worst Thing 
Bill Clinton Has Done, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1997 at 43-45.
99
 PRWORA, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.).
100 Id. § 666(a)(5).
101 See id.
102
 42 U.S.C. § 652(g).
103
 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(B)(i).
104
 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(2). Good cause may be shown where naming a putative father may result in violence 
against the mother and/or child. Other circumstances such as rape, incest, artificial insemination, and single 
parent adoption may result in a good cause showing. However, where the mother may simply not want 
assistance from the father or the father’s involvement, the State will generally demand such involvement 
when there is a request for state assistance. See Susan Notar and Vicki Turetsky, Models for Safe Child 
Support Enforcement, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 657 (2000); See generally Anna Marie Smith, 
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in identifying putative fathers without a showing of good cause will result in a reduction 
of benefits or a complete denial of assistance.105   These policies were further 
strengthened by federal legislation in 1998106 that provides significant monetary 
incentives to states to maximize paternity establishment.107
PRWORA also strengthened a variety of sanctions for nonpayment of child 
support that had been added in previous legislation.  These include income withholding, 
state and federal income tax refund intercept, and revocation of professional motor 
vehicle and recreational licenses.108 While the imposition of sanctions had traditionally 
been dependent upon judicial findings after a hearing, PRWORA made the imposition of 
most sanctions automatic.109
The federal system, then, has established a framework for paternity establishment 
for men identified by custodial mothers seeking public benefits through two principal 
methods.110  Under the most common method,111 parents can sign a voluntary paternity 
The Sexual Regulation Dimension of Contemporary Welfare Law: A Fifty State Overview, 8 MICH. J. 
GENDER & L. 121 (2002).
105
 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(2)(A), (B); “The Act specifies that applicants for TANF assistance and Medicaid 
must assign support rights, including distribution, to the state and cooperate in establishing paternity.  The 
state must deduct a minimum of twenty-five percent from a family’s cash assistance grant, and may end the 
family’s eligibility for grants altogether, for “non-cooperation” in establishing paternity, or if a child 
support order is modified or unenforced without good cause.  Additionally, if the Federal government finds 
that states are not enforcing non-cooperation sanctions against individuals, the state will be penalized up to 
five percent of the TANF block grant for the next fiscal year.” Candice Hoke, Symposium: State Discretion 
Under New Federal Welfare Legislation: Illusion, Reality, and a Federalism-Based Constitutional 
Challenge, 9 STAN L. REV. 115, 116 (1998).
106
 Child Support Performance and Incentive Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-200; Deadbeat Parents 
Punishment Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-187, 112 Stat. 618 (1998) (increasing penalties under the Child 
Support Recovery Act of 1992 from misdemeanor to felony).
107
 42 U.S.C. § 652(g).
108
 For a summary of sanctions added by child support legislation in the 1980’s and 90’s, see Naomi Cahn 
& Jane Murphy, Collecting Child Support: A History of Federal and State Initiatives, J. POVERTY L. & 
POL’Y, 165, (2000).
109
 42 U.S.C. § 666(c)(1). 
110
 The third method of establishing legal paternity is through marriage.  If the parents marry anytime 
before the birth of the child, the baby will be considered to be the legal child of the mother’s husband.  If 
the parents marry after the child’s birth and the husband publicly acknowledges the child as his, there is a 
presumption that the husband is the legal father.  See notes 24-28 supra.
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acknowledgement in the hospital, the birth record agency or other designated site.112  No 
paternity order is issued.  After 60 days, the acknowledgement itself is the legal finding 
of paternity and is entitled to full faith and credit in other states.113  Although the 
acknowledgement must contain a statement of the legal consequences of signing the 
documents, there is no requirement that counseling or genetic testing be offered or 
conducted before the acknowledgement is signed and legally binding.114
The second method of establishing paternity is through a judicial proceeding 
typically initiated by the state after the mother applies for welfare and identifies someone 
as the putative father.115  Although the child support agency must make genetic testing 
available and can order the tests without court supervision,116 there is no federal 
requirement that genetic tests be conducted before paternity is established by this method 
either.  In most cases these court based paternity proceedings are resolved by consent or 
111
 Nationally, according to the federal Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE), paternity was 
established or acknowledged for over 1.5 million children in fiscal year 2003, the last year for which data is 
currently available.  Of these, 662,500 were the result of legal actions and almost 862,000 were through the 
voluntary acknowledgment process.  Child Support Enforcement (CSE) FY 2003 Data Report (2004), 
Table 2. The report is available at www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cse/pubs.  In some states, the percentage of  
paternity establishments through voluntary acknowledgment has been particularly high.  In Massachusetts, 
for example, 77% of fathers voluntarily acknowledge paternity in the hospital.  Child Support Enforcement 
Legislation: Hearing on Welfare Reform, 2003: S. HRG 108-147 Before the Sen. Comm. on Finance, 108th 
Cong. (2003) (statement of Marilyn Ray Smith, Deputy Commissioner and IV-D Director).  The voluntary 
paternity process was used for 74.74% of unmarried births in New Jersey to establish paternity in 1997.  
Hearing Advisory on Oversight of the Child Support Enforcement Program, 1999: H.R.-10 Before the 
House Comm. on Ways and Means Human Resources Subcom., 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Alisha 
Griffin, Assistant Director New Jersey Division of Family Development).  
112
 42 U.S.C.A. § 666(a)(5)(C) (West Supp. 2002).  In some states, voluntary acknowledgment is permitted 
at a wide variety of sites including community centers, health centers, and preschool programs.  The law 
gives states the option to allow voluntary acknowledgment at sites other than hospitals and birth records 
agencies if they use the same forms and materials. 45 CFR § 302.70(a)(5)(iii)(B) and (C).
113 Id. § 666(a)(5)(C)(iv).
114 Id.  at § 666 (a)(5)(C)(i)(I).  Federal law does require that the acknowledgement form meet certain 
requirements.  Id. at § 666(a)(5)(C)(iv).  Action Transmittal 98-02 (January 23, 1998) sets forth those 
requirements.  They include current name, social security number, and date of birth of the mother and the 
father; current full name, date of birth, and birthplace of the child; a brief explanation of the legal 
significance of the document; a statement that either parent can rescind within 60 days; a clear statement 
that the parents understand that signing is voluntary and what the rights, responsibilities, and consequences 
of signing are; and signature lines for the parents and witnesses/notaries.
115
 See notes 82-84 supra and accompanying text. 
116 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 666(C)(1)(A), 666(A)(5)(B)(II)(I), 666(A)(5)(F)(III)(1999).
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default without genetic testing.117  After the consent or default, the court enters an order 
and usually sets child support at the same time.118 In contested cases of paternity, federal 
law has also streamlined the adjudication process in court and administrative proceedings 
in a variety of ways, including eliminating the right to a jury trial.119
B. From “Deadbeat” and “Duped” Dads to “Dead Broke” and 
“Disappearing” Dads
Over the last three decades, then, both the federal and state governments have 
constructed massive bureaucracies focused on making non-custodial parents – mostly low 
income fathers – pay child support.  This “revolution” in child support was, for the most 
part, enthusiastically received by many scholars and policymakers, particularly advocates 
for women and children.120  The goals of “legalizing” the father-child relationship for 
more children of unmarried parents and increasing and enforcing court-ordered child 
support for all children in single parent households held the promise of reducing child 
poverty.  Almost two decades later, however, it is time to reexamine the underlying 
assumptions driving these reforms as well as the impact of these reforms on low-income 
families.  
1. The Assumptions
The first assumption that needs to be re-examined is that the enhanced child 
support enforcement scheme is critical to putting food in the mouths of children in poor 
117 See supra notes 96, 100-03 and accompanying text.
118
 42 U.S.C. § 666.  Neither the acknowledgement process nor judicial proceedings establishing paternity 
typically provide an opportunity to address visitation or other issues related to the developing of a 
relationship between the newly recognized father and the child. Instead they are focused exclusively on 
establishing the legal basis for child support orders. Hatcher & Lieberman, infra note 167, at 8 n.19.
119
 42. U.S.C. 666(a)(5).
120 See supra note 22. 
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families.121 While there has been some success in improving child support collection,122
the child support regime has largely failed to reduce child poverty.123 There is some 
evidence that the receipt of child support may be critical to non-welfare custodial 
households.124  But the same research shows that aggressive child support enforcement 
has not reduced poverty for welfare families.125   The reasons for this are multifaceted but 
not particularly complex.  First, there has been limited success in obtaining child support 
orders for never married mothers, the population most likely to be receiving welfare 
benefits.126 Even for those children who have orders, custodial mothers receiving welfare 
obtain no benefit unless the support paid exceeds their welfare benefits.  As noted earlier, 
under the child support distribution scheme for families on welfare, the custodial parent 
assigns her right to support and the state retains support paid by noncustodial parents as 
reimbursement for welfare benefits.127
121
 Juliet Eilperin, House Bill Target Deadbeat Parents, WASH. POST, May 13, 1998, available in 1998 WL 
11579927; Cokie & Steven Roberts, Going After Those Deadbeat Dads at the Federal Level, NEW 
ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug. 1, 1997, available in 1997 WL 12658346 (reporting a statement made by 
Congressman Henry Hydein support of aggressive child support enforecement: “A lot of little kids are 
undergoing economic child abuse.”)
122 PAUL LEGLER, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, Low-Income Fathers and Child Support: Starting Off on 
the Right Track, 6 (2003) (hereinafter “Casey Study”) (child support collections increased from $8 billion 
in 1992 to $18 billion in 2000).
123
 J. THOMAS OLDHAM, CHILD SUPPORT: THE NEXT FRONTIER ix (J. Thomas Oldham & Marygold S. Melli 
eds., 2000) (summarizing recent research on the impact of child support reforms and finding “there is 
considerable evidence that reforms have failed to accomplish one of the most important objectives of child 
support, that of reducing child poverty.”)
124
 Institute For Women’s Policy Research, How Much Can Child Support Provide? Welfare, Family 
Income, and Child Support, 6 (Mar. 1999) (finding that for many non-welfare low-income families child 
support contributes to a lower poverty rate but child support does not have the same effect on single-mother 
families receiving welfare).
125 Id. See also, supra note 122-128 and accompanying text.
126
 Marsha Garrison, The Goals and Limits of Child Support Policy, in CHILD SUPPORT: THE NEXT 
FRONTIER supra note 123, at 18 (citing Bureau of Census data demonstrating that more than three quarters 
of never-married mothers still do not have child support awards.) 
127 See note 82 supra. See also, 42 U.S.C. § 657(a)(1)(A). Prior to PRWROA, a mandatory fifty-dollars 
pass through existed which gave children on welfare some benefit for child support paid on their behalf. 
Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485 § 102, 102 Stat. 2343, 2346 (1988). Even this modest 
benefit to welfare families was repealed under PRWROA. While the states may (but are not required to) 
provide a pass through of any amount they wish, it will not be financed by the federal government. 45 
U.S.C. 657(a)(1)(B).  The funding must come from the state’s portion of collected support. See id. Thus, 
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 In addition to the structural issues in welfare law that redirect child support from 
families to the state, the desperate economic circumstances of most fathers of children on 
welfare,128 almost ensures the failure of the child support system to effectively address 
child poverty.  As Marsha Garrison writes:
Child support policy can avert poverty only if that poverty derives from an 
income loss associated with family dissolution or nonformation. If parents lack 
the resources to avoid poverty when together, child support alone cannot remedy 
the problem . . .Because most poor children do not have ‘deadbeat dads’ who can 
contribute significantly to their support, child support policy will offer the most 
help to the least needy: It cannot be expected to achieve a major reduction in 
children’s poverty.129
A related assumption that needs to be reexamined is that the low-income fathers 
who are the target of aggressive enforcement are all “deadbeats.”130  The image of the 
“Deadbeat Dad” is well-entrenched in American culture.131  It evokes an image of a non-
custodial father who has impoverished his children while improving his own standard of 
living after separation from the family.132  Media coverage133 and political rhetoric134
the ever-increasing resources devoted to collect child support from low-income fathers have no direct 
impact on the financial well-being of children on welfare.
128 See supra notes 134-39 and accompanying text.
129
 Garrison, supra note 124 at 22, 25. Although beyond the scope of this Article, a number of promising 
proposals have been made to reduce child poverty by guaranteeing children a minimum level of income 
that  is not linked to the amount of  child support collected from their parents and is guaranteed through 
the child’s minority without regard to their parent’s work choices or eligibility for welfare. See e.g. Martha 
Fineman, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY (2003); Stephen D. Sugarman, Financial 
Support of Children and the End of Welfare as We Know It, 81 VIRGINIA L. REV. 2523 (1995) 
130
 Daniel Borunda, Roundup Nabs Alleged Deadbeat Dads, EL PASO TIMES, June 20, 2003, at 4; Carlos 
Sadovi, Dragnet Out for Deadbeat Dads, CHI. SUN TIMES, June 14, 2003, at 1; Robert E. Pierre, States 
Consider Laws Against Paternity Fraud; Child Advocates Worry About Effects, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 
2002, at A.
131 Id.
132 See generally Lenore Weitzman, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 323 (1985) (finding that female and child poverty 
increase after divorce, creating an overwhelming gap in the standard of living for divorced men compared 
to that of the children and ex-wives); James B. McLindon, Separate But Unequal: The Economic Disaster 
of Divorce for Women and Children, 21 FAM. L.Q. 35 (1987) (citing studies conducted in California, Ohio, 
and Vermont that indicate a grim economic outlook for women in the years following divorce).
133
 Joe Mahoney, Deadbeats in N.Y. Owe Kids $3B, N.Y. Daily News, June 30, 2000 at 5 (discussing New 
York State’s challenges in collecting child support from non-paying fathers who hide income by working 
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paint a picture of a father, usually divorced, who is middle-aged, middle class, ignoring 
his children’s needs while enjoying a prosperous lifestyle.  As one commentator has 
noted: 
The public’s anger has spread to all noncustodial fathers owing support.  
These fathers have emerged as the new villains in our culture.  ‘The 
irresponsibility of fathers takes three forms: they bring into the world 
‘illegitimate’ children they do not intend to support; they leave marriages 
they should remain in; and, whether married or not, they fail to pay support 
for the children they leave behind.’ It would not be an exaggeration to say 
that politicians of all stripes have taken up a moral crusade against 
nonsupporting fathers, condemning their immorality and selfishness.135
While these stereotypical “deadbeats” exist, many of the men owing child support 
are in fact dead broke.136  Researchers estimate that as many as 33.2% of young, 
noncustodial fathers are unable to pay child support due to poverty.137  Many low-income 
fathers have substandard education, lack marketable skills, and often have criminal 
histories that hinder employment.138  Many are minors, without strong family support.139
off the books, moving to states lax in child support enforcement, and putting assets in others’ names); Pay 
for Kids or Pay the Price, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Aug. 26, 2002 at Part 2, p. 8 (discussing the arrest of 
several parents with significant child support arrearages, including a doctor with a six figure income who 
owed $86,000 and a disbarred lawyer who writes software who also owed $86,000); Robert Pear, U.S. 
Agents Arrest Dozens of Fathers in Support Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2002 at A1 (discussing the arrest 
of a professional football player who makes approximately $1.1 million per year and owes $101,000, a 
Texas engineering company employee who owes $264,000, and a psychiatrist who owes $64,976.)
134 See note 121 supra.  See also, Ronald B. Mincy & Elaine J. Sorensen, Deadbeats and Turnips in Child 
Support Reform, 17 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 44, 48 (1998).
135
 Brito, supra note 23, at 264, citing David Chambers supra note 22 at 2576. 
136
 In Baltimore, where I direct a family law clinical program that includes a paternity and child support 
practice, most of the non-custodial parents in state initiated child support proceedings are young, poorly 
educated African-American males with little education and work experience. 
http://law.ublat.edu/clinics/familylaw. See also, Robert J. Rhudy and Joe Surkiewicz, Deadbroke Not 
Deadbeat: Child Support System Hurts Children, Families, THE DAILY RECORD, July 11, 2003.
137
 Mincy & Sorenson, supra note 132 at 47.  
138
 Elaine Sorensen, Obligating Dads: Helping Low-Income Noncustodial Fathers Do More for Their 
Children, Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute (1999); Elaine Sorensen and Chava Zibman, Poor Dads 
Who Don’t Pay Child Support: Deadbeats or Disadvantaged? In NEW FEDERALISM, NO. B-30. 
Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute (2001). PAUL OFFNER & HARRY HOLZER, THE BROOKINGS 
INSTITUTION, LEFT BEHIND ON THE LABOR MARKET: RECENT EMPLOYMENT TRENDS AMONG YOUNG 
BLACK MEN, Survey Series, (April, 2002) (finding that nationally, the employment rate for black men in 
central cities in 1999/2000 was 46.99%, compared to 53.24% in metropolitan areas overall and 63.09% in 
the suburbs.)
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Many are substance abusers, have mental or physical disabilities which can contribute to 
economic and family instability.140  They are often immigrants for whom English is a 
second language.141  All of these circumstances have created a substantial group of non-
custodial fathers who are subject to child support obligations they are simply unable to 
meet.  They accrue large arrears, are subject to sanctions, and fall further into the cycle of 
poverty.
2. The Impact
A number of child support establishment and modification policies place special
burdens on these low-income child support obligors.  The first impact of the new policies 
is the pressure placed on unmarried fathers to voluntarily acknowledge or consent to 
paternity orders. As discussed earlier, a cornerstone of the federal effort to reduce welfare 
costs has been to increase paternity establishment.142  On its face, this aspect of “welfare 
reform” has been a success with numbers of paternity establishments increasing 
dramatically over the last decade.143  Strengthening the bond between children of 
unmarried parents and their fathers can certainly yield important social144 and 
139
 Paula Roberts, No Minor Matter: Developing a Coherent Policy on Paternity Establishment for 
Children Born to Underage Parents, CLASP POLICY BRIEF (Center for Law & Social Policy, Washington, 
D.C.) (March 2004) (finding that “[t]here are roughly 150,000 babies born each year to unwed parents at 
least one of whom is a minor (typically under 18).”)
140 WENDELL PRIMUS & KRISTINA DAUGIRDAS, CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, IMPROVING 
CHILD WELL-BEING BY FOCUSING ON LOW-INCOME NONCUSTODIAL PARENTS IN MARYLAND 3, 23-25 
(2000).
141 Looking to the Future: A Commentary on Children of Immigrant Families, The Center for Law and 
Social Policy (Oct. 2004).
142 See notes 89-92 supra and accompanying text. 
143
 Between 1992 and 2000, paternity establishment increased from 500,000 to 1.5 million.  Casey Study,
supra note 122, at 6. See also, Virginia Ellis, Fathers’ Legal Ties that Bind, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1998, at 
A1 (highlighting the increase in paternity filings since the January, 1997 enactment of PRWORA and 
finding there was a 600% increase in the number of fathers signing paternity declarations in 1997).
144 See, e.g., David Blankenhorn, Fatherless America: Confirming Our Most Urgent Social Problem 
(summarizing research demonstrating the importance of the involvement of fathers in children’s emotional 
development, success in school and adult relationships); JAMES A. LEVINE WITH EDWARD W. PITT, NEW 
EXPECTATIONS: COMMUNITY STRATEGIES FOR RESPONSIBLE FATHERHOOD 26-27 (1995) (explaining that 
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economic145 benefits.  While the legal establishment of paternity may have some 
connection, these social and economic benefits do not automatically follow from a 
paternity order.146  Moreover, the efforts to encourage early and easy paternity 
establishment may cause more harm than good for fathers and children when they result 
in efforts to disestablish paternity several years later.  
The demographic profile of many of the fathers who fall behind in child support 
discussed earlier – young, poor, uneducated147 – make them particularly vulnerable in the 
paternity establishment process.  What was once a full quasi-criminal adversarial process 
often including a jury trial,148 has become, more often than not, a non-judicial process 
that involves little more than signing a piece of paper.149  While federal law requires oral 
and written disclosure of information about the legal consequences of paternity 
establishment before voluntary acknowledgment,150 the disclosures are not an effective 
substitute for legal counsel, or even the advice of an informed layperson. Interviews with 
men who voluntarily acknowledged or consented to paternity in this context make clear 
the limitations of written disclosures in meaningfully informing putative fathers of the 
nurturing father-involvement during infancy dramatically improves a child’s cognitive, intellectual, and 
social development throughout childhood).
145
 Judith Selzer, Child Support and Child Access:  Experiences of Divorced and Nonmarital Families in 
Child Support, in CHILD SUPPORT: THE NEXT FRONTIER, supra note 123, at 69, 73-74. 
146
 Because of other differences between fathers who establish paternity and those that don’t, “research 
cannot yet answer the question of how the legal establishment of paternity - - by itself, after other 
differences between parents who do and do not establish paternity are taken into account, affects the 
emotional and financial support available to children of unmarried parents.”  NATIONAL WOMEN’S LAW 
CENTER & CENTER ON FATHERS, FAMILIES, & PUBLIC POLICY, FAMILY TIES: IMPROVING PATERNITY 
ESTABLISHMENT PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES FOR LOW-INCOME MOTHERS, FATHERS AND CHILDREN 7 
(2000) [hereinafter FAMILY TIES].  See also infra note 212.
147 See supra notes 134-39.   
148 HARRY D. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW & SOCIAL POLICY (1971).
149 See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.  
150
 PRWORA §666(a)(5)(C)(i).
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legal consequences of acknowledging paternity.151  In addition, many acknowledgments 
occur in a hospital setting shortly after the child’s birth.  This heightens the emotional 
pressures that tend to result in acknowledgments by non-biological fathers.152
The judicial process for establishment of paternity orders offers more procedural 
safeguards than the voluntary acknowledgment process, but there are still substantial 
risks in the judicial context that men will become legal fathers with little understanding of 
the legal consequences.  In the case of judgments entered by default, putative fathers 
often do not get actual notice of the proceedings and the judgment is entered without their 
knowledge or participation.153  Even if they are present in court, putative fathers are 
rarely represented by counsel,154 and both the volume of cases and the routine treatment 
of cases by the child support agency or its counsel leave many fathers misinformed about 
the significance of the proceedings.155  As a result of all these circumstances, many men 
151 FAMILY TIES, supra note 144, at 17; These observations confirm the author’s experience in interviewing 
pro se litigants in paternity establishment proceedings in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.  See, 
Margaret Barry, Accessing Justice: Are Pro Se Clinics A Reasonable Response to the Lack of Pro Bono 
Legal Services and Should Law School Clinics Conduct Them?, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1879, 1903-04 
(1999) (describing University of Baltimore Family Law Clinic and University of Maryland Pro Se Project).
152
 Participants in the Common Ground Project described the hospital locale as “problematic” and 
“expressed concerns about the hospital setting because current hospital maternity stays are brief and the 
period surrounding childbirth is emotionally stressful.  Thus, parents are often not emotionally or mentally 
equipped to digest the paternity acknowledgment form and/or make a decision during the hospital 
maternity stay.” FAMILY TIES, supra note 144 at 12. The pressure to acknowledge paternity in this setting is 
increased by the statutory requirement that a nonmarital father’s name cannot appear on a child’s birth 
certificate unless he has signed an acknowledgment of paternity or has been adjudicated to be the father by 
a court or administrative tribunal. PRWORA, 42 U.S.C. §666(a)(5)(D)(i)(I & II).
153
 Casey Study, supra note 122 at 18-22.
154
 Steven K. Berenson, A Family Law Residency Program? A Modest Proposal in Response to the Burdens 
Created by Self-Represented Litigants in Family Court, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 105, 110 (2001) (describing  a 
1991-1992 study of sixteen large urban areas nationwide finding that 72% of all domestic relations cases 
involved at least one unrepresented party).  See also,  Maryland Judiciary Administrative Office of the 
Courts Family Administration, 2003 Annual Report of the Maryland Circuit Court Family Divisions and 
Family Services Programs, 29-30 (2003) (64% of litigants in family disputes in Maryland were self-
represented.   
155
 Stacy L. Brustin, The Intersection Between Welfare Reform and Child Support Enforcement: D.C.’s 
Weak Link, 52 CATHOLIC UNIV. L. REV. 621, 643 (2003); See also, Gantt v. Sanchez, infra note 199, 
testimony of Sanchez, record at 28-32 (one father’s testimony describing his confusion about the legal 
ramifications of signing a paternity acknowledgement and lack of explanation about the process).
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acknowledged or consented to paternity with very little understanding of the legal 
ramifications of their actions.
Another factor leading to the ultimate push to disestablish paternity are the 
potentially unfair child support orders established for low-income fathers following the 
establishment of paternity.  As noted, since the late 1980’s, states have made initial 
awards of support based on a variety of fixed formulas.  The most common approach to 
establishing an initial award of child support is the Income Shares Model.156 These 
formulae base child support obligations on the marginal costs of raising children in a two-
parent family.157  This “one size fits all” approach to child support can result in 
unreasonably high awards for low-income obligors. The Income Shares formulae take a 
larger percentage of income from low-income obligors because low-income families have 
to spend a greater percentage of their income on their children.158  In addition, as one 
scholar observed, for most non-marital families where children have never lived in an 
intact household, the Income Shares Model’s “replication of past expenditures is pure 
fiction.”159
In addition to formulae skewed against low-income obligors, several other 
policies and circumstances at the establishment stage contribute to punitive awards for 
low-income fathers.  The definition of income embodied in statutes and  case law permit 
156 KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW 735 (2002).
157
 Data used to establish the costs of raising children in a two parent family were originally based on a 
1984 study by Thomas Espenshade, supra note 85. 
158 See also, Casey Study, supra note 122, at 11 (finding that both the Income Shares Model and other 
provisions of state guidelines such as the child care and medical expenses provision and adjustments when 
fathers have multiple families contribute to “regressive” guidelines “requiring low-income custodial parents 
to pay a larger share of their income toward child support than higher-income non-custodial parents.”  See 
also, Vicki Lynn Bell, Alimony and Child Support Generally: Amend Child Support Calculations, 12 GA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 169, 176 (1995) (finding that many Income Shares guideline models for child support take a 
higher percentage of income from low-income obligors than is taken from high income obligors).
159
 Marsha Garrison, Child Support Policy: Guidelines and Goals, 37 ABA FAM.L.Q. 157, 168 (1999).
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courts or agencies to impute income to obligors if, under varying criteria, the fact finder 
believes the obligor is earning less than he should be.160  The theory behind such 
imputation of income statutes is that they can be used to discourage obligors from 
underreporting income and will encourage full employment.161  However, when such 
policies are applied to obligors who are chronically unemployed or in seasonal or other 
part time employment, they result in unpayable support and ever increasing arrearages.162
Even where legitimate defenses to imputation of income exist, without legal counsel 
these obligors often are unable to present them.163  Moreover, given the high rate of 
default judgments for child support orders,164 many obligors are not even present to 
provide testimony about their income and ability to pay.
The problems associated with excessive initial awards are often compounded by 
child support modification policies.  First, state laws on when modification is justified 
vary considerably.165  Some states do not permit downward modification in situations in 
which an obligor is clearly unable to maintain the income earned or imputed at the point 
of the initial award.166  For example, in some states, incarceration is not a sufficient basis 
160 LAURA W. MORGAN, CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES: INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION § 2.04[C] 
(1996).
161 Id.
162
  Office of Child Support Enforcement, Table 11, Total Amount of Arrearages Due, FY 2003.
163 See supra note 152.
164
 Casey Study, supra note 122, at 18-22; NATIONAL WOMEN’S LAW CENTER & CENTER ON FATHERS, 
FAMILIES AND PUBLIC POLICY, DOLLARS AND SENSE: IMPROVING THE DETERMINATION OF CHILD SUPPORT 
OBLIGATIONS FOR LOW-INCOME MOTHERS, FATHERS AND CHILDREN, 13 (2000) [hereinafter DOLLARS AND 
SENSE].
165 MORGAN, supra note 158 at § 5.01 (discussing the common law standard for modification: substantial 
change in circumstances which generally requires proof of a change that is material, substantial and 
permanent).
166 See e.g., In re Marriage of Thurmond, 962 P.2D 1064 (Kan. 1998) (refusing to reduce or suspend 
support obligation where parent’s incarceration was the only change of circumstances); See Staffon v. 
Staffon, 587 S.E.2d 630 (Ga. 2003) (where the natural and foreseeable consequences of father’s voluntary 
conduct resulted in his imprisonment, placing him in a position where he was unable to earn income, a 
downward modification of child support was not warranted); Yerkes v. Yerkes, 824 A.2d 1169 (Pa. 2003)
(court adopted “no justification” approach, holding that criminal incarceration was not sufficient to justify a 
reduction in child support; the court considered the best interests of the child and principles of fairness by 
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for a downward modification.  Even in those situations where the law supports a 
reduction of child support, lack of legal representation often prevents timely application 
for modification.167  Since 1989, federal law has prohibited retroactive modification of 
arrearages.168  This is sound policy when applied as a check against judicial discretion 
that was often exercised to forgive arrearages for middle or high-income obligors who 
repeatedly evaded their support obligation.  When rigidly applied to low-income obligors, 
however, this policy becomes another example of the unintended consequences of the 
welfare policy.169  For example, a father may become disabled or become custodian of 
the children. Unless he initiates a court action promptly, he will continue to owe child 
support and arrearages will accumulate indefinitely to a point where payment is no longer 
possible.170
not allowing obligor to benefit from his criminal acts); Mascola v. Lusskin, 727 SO.2d 328 (Fla. 1999)
(father’s reduction in income due to his incarceration was insufficient to relieve him of his child support 
obligation because the reduction was caused by his voluntary acts); Mooney v. Brennan, 848 P.2d 1020 
(Mont. 1993) (court held it was not unconscionable to refuse a downward modification of father’s child 
support obligation when the changed circumstances were due to his incarceration for the commission of a 
crime); Koch v. Williams, 456 N.W. 2d 299 (N.D. 1990) (former husband’s incarceration for incest was 
voluntary and self-induced, failing to constitute a material change in circumstances warranting a 
modification of child support); Knights v. Knights, 522 N.E.2d 104, 571 N.Y.2d 865 (1988) (ex-husband’s 
application for modification of child support was denied as his financial hardship was a result of wrongful
conduct resulting in his incarceration); Carlsen v. State of Utah Dept. of Soc. Serv., 722 P.2d 775 (Utah
1986) (holding that ex-husband must reimburse state for public support given his child while he was 
incarcerated and unable to make child support payments). But see VT. STAT. ANN. tit.15, § 660(f)(2003)
(allowing the court discretion to modify an order as to past support installments accruing after noncustodial 
parent’s incarceration); Bendixen v. Bendixen, 962 P.2d 170 (Alaska 1998) (father’s incarceration was not 
equivalent to voluntary unemployment; reduction of father’s child support obligation was dependent on his 
ability to establish a substantial reduction in income due to incarceration); Glenn v. Glenn, 848 P.2d 819 
(Wyo. 1993) (court found that father’s sentence of life imprisonment constituted a change in circumstances 
and reduced his monthly child support obligation.  See generally, Prisons Offer No Escape from Paying 
Child Support, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2000 at § 1, p.35.
167 See note 152, supra.
168
 42 U.S.C. 666(a)(9)(c)(Supp. 1999). Child support obligations are also not dischargeable in bankruptcy. 
11 U.S.C. 523(a)(1999).
169
 Daniel L. Hatcher & Hannah Lieberman, Breaking The Cycle of Defeat for “Deadbroke” Noncustodial 
Parents Through Advocacy on Child Support Issues, 37 J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 5 (May-June 2003).
170 Id.
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Whether through inappropriate guidelines, imputation of income, or modification 
policies, unrealistically high awards lead to high arrearages.171  Low-income obligors are 
then subject to child support enforcement sanctions. As noted, these sanctions include 
income attachment, motor vehicle and professional license suspension, credit reporting, 
and incarceration.172  While enforcement actions were once judicial proceedings, most, 
except incarceration, are now done administratively without an opportunity for a hearing 
before imposition of the sanction.173 The impact of these sanctions is further strengthened 
by a system of tracking and collecting information on fathers who owe child support174
that “creates a detailed profile of who you are, what you do, and what you are likely to 
do.”175 Under “the most onerous form of debt collection practiced in the United 
States,”176 jobs, credit history and housing are lost, and economically fragile 
circumstances become desperate. 
In the past, these sanctions often led to legal fathers going “underground.”177 In 
recent years, many fathers have discovered a new way to defend these child support 
171 See notes 155-56, 161, 164, supra.
172 See note108 supra and accompanying text.
173
 Most enforcement actions are triggered by a missed child support payment tracked by the computer for 
the agency.  Those that the agency can take without seeking a court or administrative order include income 
withholding, securing assets (including bank accounts, workers’ compensation payments, employment 
compensation payments, retirement and pension funds), imposing liens, voiding fraudulent property 
transfers, suspending professional and recreational licenses, and revoking passports. PRWORA, Pub. L. 
No. 104-193, §§ 364, 368-70, 459, 110 Stat. 2242 (1996). 
174
 42 U.S.C. §666(a)(5)(C)(2004); see generally, Robert Pear, Vast Worker Database to Track Deadbeat 
Parents, N.Y.TIMES, Sept. 22, 1997 at A1.
175
 Samuel V. Schoonmaker, IV, Consequences and Validity of Family Law Provisions in the “Welfare 
Reform Act,” 14 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW 1, 146 (1997). There is some recognition in the statute that 
the massive information sharing contemplated under the statute may violate the privacy of obligors. 
PRWROA, 42 U.S.C. 654(26) (requiring that safeguards established to ensure access to confidential 
information are limited to authorized persons). But commentators point out that these provisions are 
rendered “practically meaningless by other provisions in the law that permit broad information sharing.” 
Brito, supra note 23, at 263.
176
 Ronald K. Henry, Child Support at a Crossroads: When the Real World Intrudes upon Academics and 
Advocates, 33 FAM. L.Q. 235, 239 (1999).
177
 Hatcher & Lieberman, supra note 167, at 5.
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actions by challenging the underlying order of paternity.178  Courts have responded to 
these paternity challenges in a variety of ways.  While no coherent patterns have 
emerged, 179 not surprisingly, children of married parents are generally more protected 
than children of unmarried parents. Courts hearing competing claims for fatherhood of 
married children often preserve the relationship between the child and the married father, 
even if the husband is the psychological rather than the biological father. 180  In a few 
178
 Under traditional state law, final civil judgments can only be reopened in cases of fraud, duress or 
material mistake of fact.  See e.g., Tandra S. v. Tyrone W., 648 A.2d 439 (Md. 1994).  State law varies on 
what constitutes mistake, fraud, or duress but many states now permit reopening based on an exception to 
this final judgment rule or based on the father’s assertion that he was “defrauded” about the biological link 
with his child.  Roberts, infra note 177, at 82-85.
 While many of these disestablishment actions are triggered by onerous child support burdens, they are 
facilitated by changes in the DNA testing technology making such testing more accessible. Until a few 
years ago, paternity testing was invasive, required the participation of both parents and the child and cost 
from $700-$1,000.  Recent advances allow DNA testing through a simple cheek swab, no longer require 
the participation of the mother, and can cost as little as $200 when done through a private rather than court 
ordered lab testing.  A June 15, 2004 web search revealed over 50 sites that made mention of paternity 
testing kits.  Dozens of these sites advertised home testing kits free or at low cost.  See, e.g., 
www.genetree.com, which offers to ship free kits (payment is made if you send the samples back for 
testing) and www.prophase-genetics.com, which offers kits and results for $160.
179
 For a thorough analysis of paternity disestablishment statutes and case law, see Paula Roberts, Truth & 
Consequences, Parts I-III, 37 FAM. L.Q. 35-103 (2003); Paula Roberts, Paternity Disestablishment Case 
Update (June, 2004).
180
 Relying on the marital presumption, many courts have denied DNA testing and dismissed these cases.  
See, e.g., Evans v. Wilson, 2004 Md. LEXIS 502 (denying unmarried paramour’s attempt to establish 
paternity in light of mother’s husband’s status as legal father); In re Marriage of Pedregon, 132 Ca. Rptr. 2d 
861, 107 Cal. App. 4th 1284 (2003) (court ruled that where the husband held out a non-biological child as 
his own, he established the paternal relationship and was required to pay child support); Betty L.W. v. 
William E.W., 569 S.E.2d 77, 86 (W. Va. 2002) (non-biological father’s acknowledgement of marital child 
as his own for six years during marriage and four years after divorce precluded him from terminating or 
modifying child support); Leger v. Leger, 829 So. 2d 1101 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (wife had no legal authority 
to rebut presumption of husband’s paternity when the child was born during the marriage or within 300 
days after the divorce); In the Interest of T.S.S., 61 S.W.3d 481, 487 (Tex. App. 2001) (court refused to 
admit DNA evidence excluding husband as biological father where parents were married and father had 
acknowledged child as his own for 14 years); Culhane v. Michels, 615 N.W.2d 580, 589 (S.D. 2000) (court 
cited welfare of children when denying genetic testing where father challenged paternity of marital children 
whom he had acknowledged as his own for 17 years); McHone v. Sosnowski,  609 N.W. 2d 844 (Mich. 
App. 2000) (court held that alleged biological father could not bring claim unless there was a prior 
determination that child was not the product of the marriage); Strauser v. Stahr, 726 A.2d 1052, 1053 (Pa. 
1999) (court rejected DNA evidence excluding husband as father of parties’ youngest child based on 
marital presumption and best interest of child born to married parents); Godin v. Godin, 725 A.2d 904, 910-
11 (Vt. 1998) (court denied husband’s motion for paternity testing citing the marital presumption of 
paternity and the superior interests of the state, the family and the child in “maintaining the continuity, 
financial support, and psychological security of an established parent-child relationship”); Rodney F. v. 
Karen M., 71 Ca. Rptr. 2d 399 (1998) (court found that an alleged biological father could not bring a 
paternity action due to the presumption of paternity of marital father); Amrhein v. Cozad, 714 A.2d 409 
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states, paternity disestablishment requests have been denied for both children of married 
and unmarried parents under statutes of limitations or on estoppel grounds that cut off a 
man’s right to challenge paternity after a period of time.181  But in a growing number of 
jurisdictions - even where disestablishment will leave a child fatherless - courts182 and 
(Pa. 1998) (court held that presumption of paternity was not overcome by DNA test eliminating husband as 
biological father); John M. v. Paula T., 524 Pa. 306, 571 A.2d 1380 (1990) (court held that marital 
presumption can be overcome only by proving non-access or impotency); Watts v. Watts, 337 A.2d 350, 
352 (N.H. 1975) (court denied husband’s motion for blood tests where parents were married and father did 
acknowledge children for 15 years).  But see, Brinkley v. King, 701 A.2d 176, 181 (Pa. 1997) (court 
admitted DNA evidence that proved husband was not the biological father of the child produced during 
marriage because parents were no longer married at time of action and therefore there was no institution of 
marriage to protect); Witso v. Overby, 627 N.W.2d 63 (Minn. 2001) (court granted DNA testing to father 
who asserted that he had an affair with a married woman who had child.);K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399 
(Ind. 1996) (holding that Indiana law permits a man who claims to be the biological father of a child born 
during the marriage of the child’s mother and another man to file a paternity action while that marriage 
remains intact).
181 See, e.g., Lefler v. Lefler, 776 So.2d 319 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2001) (FL Rule 12.540 – paternity 
judgments cannot be reopened after 1 year); D.F. v. Dept. of Rev., 823 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 2002) (FL Rule 
12.540 – paternity judgments cannot be reopened after 1 year); In re Paternity of Cheryl, 746 N.E.2d , 488 
(2001) (MA rule 60(b) – judgment may only be reopened within a “reasonable time”); Romine v. Trip, No. 
00CA12, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 4602 (Sept. 29, 2000) (OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2151.232, 3111.211, 
5101.314 – paternity judgments cannot be reopened after one year); People v. R.L.C., 47 P.3d 327 (Colo. 
2002) (judgments may only be reopened within a “reasonable time”); DeGrande v. Demby, 529 N.W.2d 40 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (§ 257.57 (Minn. Parentage Act)- paternity judgments cannot be reopened after 3 
years); In re Kates, 761 N.E.2d 153 (Ill. 2001) (Ill. Parentage Act § 8(a)(4) – paternity action cannot be 
brought more than two years after adjudicated father obtains “actual knowledge of relevant facts”); F.B. v. 
A.L.G., 821 A.2d 1157 (N.J. 2003) (several years after putative father waived right to genetic tests and 
acknowledged paternity, he sought to vacate the judgment of paternity and support and was denied because 
he did not prove fraud and he had acted as the father for eight years).  See also, Ronald W. Nelson, Statute 
of Limitations for Paternity Obligations and their Support Obligations, available at 
www.supportguidelines.com/articles/art200107.html(2001); But see, Dixon v. Pouncy, 979 P.2d 520 (Ark. 
1999) (Rule 60(b)(5) – claim brought two and one-half years after divorce was not unreasonable).
182Ex Parte Alabama ex rel. A.T., 695 So. 2d 624 (Ala. 1997) (court admitted DNA evidence based on 
Alabama statute AL § 26-17A-1 which permits reopening of paternity cases based on DNA evidence); KB 
v. DB & Another, 635 N.E.2d 275 (1994); Langston v. Riffe, 754 A.2d 389 (Md. 2000) (court held that 
DNA testing was available to the man in this case and is available to any punitive father who sought to 
challenge a paternity declaration entered against him); Walter v. Gunter, 788 A.2d 609 (Md. 2002) (court 
held that DNA evidence was admissible in challenging paternity, and once it was established the unmarried 
man was not biological father, he could not be held liable for arrearages in child support);  Lipiano v. 
Lipiano, 598 A.2d 854 (Md. 1991) (court permitted married man to admit DNA evidence to challenge 
paternity); Sider v. Sider, 639 A.2d 1076 (Md. 1994) (court permitted married man to admit DNA evidence 
to challenge paternity);  Missouri v. Hill, 53 S.W.3d 137 (Mo. 2001) (court permitted unmarried man to 
admit DNA evidence to challenge paternity); Brinkley v. King, 701 A.2d 176 (Pa. 1997); Alaska Dept. of 
Revenue v. Button, 7 P.3d 74 (Alaska 2000) (court allowed DNA evidence to be admitted 9 years after 
paternity acknowledgement by non-biological father).  But see, Smith v. Jones, 566 So. 2d 408 (Ct. App. 
1990) (court admitted DNA evidence presented by biological father but found that the child may have two 
‘fathers’, i.e. “dual paternity”).
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legislatures183 have opted for a rule based on biology.  Under various articulations of this 
rule, if a man, who has been the legal father by conduct or by a paternity judgment or 
acknowledgement, has suspicions about his biological connection to the child, he is 
entitled to have DNA testing on demand.184  If tests exclude him as the biological father, 
he is no longer a father under the law and has no legal, emotional or other obligations to 
his child.  
A rule based on biology alone has potentially devastating effects in any family.  
But its effects on low-income families are particularly harmful. It completes a cycle in 
which the punitive aspects of welfare reform – first aimed at the mother, and then the 
father – may culminate in leaving children fatherless.  Taking a closer look at one state’s 
experience with the new fatherhood rules illustrates the connections between welfare 
reform, paternity disestablishment, and harm to children left fatherless.
C. Case Study:  Maryland
Maryland is one of several states that have opted to define fathers by biology in 
response to legal fathers who defend against child support enforcement actions by 
seeking paternity disestablishment. The leading Maryland case, Langston v. Riffe,185
involved three consolidated cases that arose in response to child support proceedings 
involving men who had voluntarily acknowledged paternity of their children under the 
new procedures.186  The state’s highest court held that pursuant to 1995 amendments to 
183 ALA. CODE § 26-17-12 (2003), CAL. FAM. CODE § 4935 (West 2003), MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-
1029 (2003), ALASKA STAT. § 25.27.166(b)(2) (Michie 2002); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-115 (Michie 2003); 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-107(1)(B) (2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-54 (2002); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/7 
(2003); IOWA CODE § 600B.41; (2000); MINN. STAT. § 257.57(b) (2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-
105(3)(b) (2003); OHIO REV. CODE § 3119.962 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-49.10 (2004).
184 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-1029 as interpreted in Langston.
185 754 A.2d 389 (Md. 2000). 
186 Id. at 390-92.
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the state’s paternity statute,187 the fathers were allowed to set aside the paternity 
judgments when genetic tests excluded them as biological fathers.  The court further 
noted that the best interests of the child standard is not relevant when considering 
requests for DNA testing or requests to set aside judgments after DNA testing excludes 
the legal father as the biological father.188  The court also held that, although the decision 
would leave the children involved fatherless because the biological fathers would likely 
never be found, these considerations should not “diminish the immediate substantive 
effect of setting aside an established paternity declaration.”189
In 2002 Maryland’s highest court revisited the issue of paternity disestablishment 
and child support in Walter v. Gunter.190  Again, the context was a legal father’s attempt 
to set aside a paternity judgment as a defense to a child support arrearage case.  In 1993, 
Nicholas Walter voluntarily consented to a paternity judgment for a child born to his 
girlfriend, Michele Gunter.  Walter was then ordered to pay child support and throughout 
the next several years numerous proceedings were instituted against Walter to enforce the 
support obligation.  In 2000, he filed a petition to modify support as well as a motion for 
genetic testing.  The testing excluded Walter as the biological father and the trial court 
followed its earlier decision in Langston and terminated his future support obligations.191
A separate hearing was held to determine Walter’s liability for his child support 
arrearages and whether he was entitled to recover support payments that he had already 
187
 A declaration of paternity may be modified or set aside: 2. if a blood or genetic test done in accordance 
with §5-1029 [Blood or genetic tests] of this subtitle establishes the exclusion of the individual named as 
the father in the order. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. CODE § 5-1038(2)(1)(Michie 2001).
188
 “Simply stated, the fact of who the father of a child is cannot be changed by what might be in the best 
interests of the child. [T]he ‘best interests’ standard is only to be considered by the trial court in matters 
corollary to the paternity declaration, such as custody, visitation, ‘giving bond,’ or ‘any other matter that is 
related to the general welfare and best interests of the child.” Langston, 754 A.2d at 405.
189 Id. at 464.
190
 788 A.2d 609 (2002).
191 Id. at 611.
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paid to Gunter.192  Based on the well-established statutory prohibition against retroactive 
modification of child support,193 the trial court denied his request for release from the 
arrearage obligation and recoupment of payments.  
Walter appealed the judgment holding him liable for arrearages and the Maryland 
Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court and found that Walter was not 
responsible for payment of the arrearages.194  The court found that although the record 
showed that Walter had questions about his paternity for some time before the action, the 
genetic test ‘extinguished’ Walter’s parenthood.  As a result, the child support order, 
including arrearages in excess of $11,000 was vacated.195  The court relied on the state’s 
history of placing child support “squarely upon the shoulders of the natural (biological) 
parents”196 as well as principles of natural law.197  In so holding the court clearly equated 
fatherhood with biology:
Without question, the biological and legal status of ‘parenthood’ in Walter’s 
situation is now extinct; the genetic test extinguishes the prior, and the vacatur of 
the paternity declaration extinguishes the latter.  In the absence of ‘parenthood’ 
192 Id.
193
 ( fed stat on retroactive modification); MD. CODE ANN. § 5-1038 (Michie 2001).
194
 The Maryland court did not require the mother to reimburse the legal father for child support.  Walter, 
788 A.2d at 613. Some states have allowed tort actions to proceed against mothers to recover child support 
in this context. G.A.W. v. D.M.W., 596 N.W.2d 284 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (during dissolution of 
marriage, ex-husband discovered he was not the biological father and commenced a tort action against 
mother to recover child support; the court held the claim was not barred by res judicata, collateral estoppel 
or public policy considerations); Miller v. Miller, 956 P.2d 887 (Okla. 1998) (ex-husband discovered he 
was not the biological father of a child for whom he had paid support for ten years; he sued the mother for 
fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress and the court permitted these claims).  See also, 
Andrew S. Epstein, The Parent Trap: Should a Man Be Allowed to Recoup Child Support Payments If He 
Discovers He Is Not the Biological Father of the Child?, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 665 (2004).  In addition, at least 
one state statute authorizes repayment of child support paid to the state.  CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-
171(6)(2003) (if a court reopens a paternity case in which the person adjudicated to be the father of a child
is not the father of the child, and the person has paid child support to the statue (as opposed to the mother), 
the Department of Social Services will refund the money paid to the state).
195Walter, 788 A.2d 609.
196 Id. at 615 (quoting Brown v. Brown, 412 A.2d 396, 402 (Md. 1980)).
197
 “The duty of parents to provide for the maintenance of their children, is a principle of natural law; an 
obligation laid on them not only by nature herself, but by their own proper act, in bringing them into the 
world.” Id. at 615 (quoting 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 447 (1854).
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status, the duty that is normally cast upon parents, e.g. the duty of child support, 
can no longer exist.”198
Maryland’s approach in Langston and Walter exemplifies an approach to defining 
fatherhood that does not serve the interests of families, particularly low-income fathers or 
children.  To the extent the parents and child function as a family, these families are 
destabilized when the child can be subjected to genetic testing at any time, thus 
contributing to the breakup of an intact family.  The threat of DNA testing on demand 
destabilizes the relationships between parents as well as those between father and child 
and undermines all the existing policies favoring fathers’ continued involvement in 
children’s lives.  In many cases, particularly those involving older children, there is no 
one “waiting in the wings” to be the child’s father.199  Vacating the paternity judgment or 
acknowledgment leaves the child fatherless for life, with the attendant loss of emotional 
support, companionship, child support, inheritance rights, and other benefits. Even where 
the child has already lost contact with the legal father, the child’s loss is further 
exacerbated by finding out that the only father she has ever known does not want to be 
her father anymore.200  Many fathers who would be willing and might prefer to stay in a 
child’s life are forced to seek disestablishment of paternity or face loss of employment, 
credit standing, jail or permanent poverty.
A brief look at one of the author’s clinical program’s typical cases demonstrates 
the link between child support policies and the breakup of fragile families.  The clinic’s 
198
 Walter, 788 A.2d 609, 615 n.9.
199
 From the Paternity Disestablishment caseload of  University of Baltimore School of Law Family Law 
Clinic,(1998-2000) supra note 134.
200 Id. See also, Judith S. Wallerstein and Joan Berlin Kelly, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP 219 (1980) (children 
choose to maintain established parent-child relationships even where the relationship is poor or has 
deteriorated).
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child client, Maria M., was fourteen years old when the court appointed the clinic to 
represent her in an action by her father to vacate his paternity judgment.201 Until Maria 
was about four years old, she lived with her mother.  Her mother’s boyfriend, James, had 
assumed the role of Maria’s father, lived with her and her mother at various times during 
these four years but did not provide regular financial support. When the mother applied 
for public benefits, she identified James as Maria’s father.  He consented to paternity 
without genetic testing.  
The parties grew apart, the mother became drug addicted, and Maria went to live 
with her grandmother when she was four years old.  Ten years later, James sought to 
reopen the paternity judgment after his truck driver’s license was revoked and he was 
subject to criminal prosecution for nonsupport.  Since he never had a genetic test prior to 
signing the paternity decree, he was able to challenge his paternity under the Maryland 
statute by requesting a blood test.  At the hearing, a child development expert testified 
that, given Maria’s circumstances, even the act of requiring her to go through a blood test 
and thereby learn of her father’s effort to “disown” her would cause her substantial 
harm.202  The father testified that he, too, had some emotional attachment to the child and 
did not wish to hurt her.203  Under existing law, however, he had to make a choice 
between risking harm to her or facing financial ruin for himself and his biological 
children.204
201 Gantt v. Sanchez ,Case No. PD 60-104431 (Baltimore City Circ.Ct. 1999) Although the use of first 
names for clients is not customary in the author’s clinical program, first names have been used for easy 
identification and to protect the parties’ identities.
202 Id., testimony of Leon Rosenberg, record at 7-8 (on file with the Author).
203 Id., testimony of Sanchez, record at 38-40.
204 Id., testimony of Sanchez, record at 22-23.
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Given the Langston biology rule, Maryland courts and those in other states 
following the biology rule must permit genetic testing when requested and vacate 
paternity orders in all cases where there is no biological connection between child and 
father, regardless of the family’s circumstances.  Moreover, given the inflexibility of the 
current child support policies, courts have little or no discretion to reduce arrearages, 
suspend child support obligations, or provide fathers like James with some equitable 
remedies that will permit them to maintain their legal status as father.  Instead, children 
like Maria are left fatherless for life.205
III.    Proposals for Reform
To develop meaningful reform, policymakers must reconceive child support as 
primarily an issue of family law rather than welfare law.  As such, protection of children 
replaces state and federal fiscal concerns as the goal that drives child support law and 
policy.206  Once that goal is clear, the foundation will be laid for a number of reforms.  
These include:  1) refining paternity establishment policies to reduce the number of 
fathers who assume the role of fatherhood mistakenly or with little thought about the 
consequences207  2) refining child support establishment and modification policies to treat 
low-income fathers more fairly so that they are not pushed into paternity disestablishment 
205
 In Maria’s case, the parties ultimately reached a settlement in which the father agreed to maintain his 
status as legal father as long as the local State’s Attorney’s Office (the office charged with child support 
enforcement in the jurisdiction) refrained from enforcing his past, present or future child support 
obligations.  All parties believed such a settlement was the best option for the child in this case given 
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 The goal of these efforts should not be to prevent all non-biological fathers from gaining the status of 
legal fatherhood.  Instead, the goal is to have men consent to paternity only when they have made a 
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In some cases, men who have no genetic connection may also make a decision to become legal fathers.
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as the only alternative to financial ruin; and 3) creating paternity disestablishment 
policies that place the best interests of the child above the interests of the adults and 
recognize multiple bases for legal fatherhood.
A. Rethinking the Link Between Welfare and Child Support
As scholars and policymakers begin to evaluate the impact of the last three
decades of federal legislation, many are beginning to question the link that body of 
legislation established between welfare and child support.208  While a careful evaluation 
of this link is beyond the scope of this Article, a brief assessment of the impact of linking 
child support with welfare law reveals both its policy limitations and its negative impact
on low-income families.
As discussed earlier, aggressive child support enforcement has done little to 
reduce child poverty. 209  The linking child support collection with welfare eligibility has 
also largely failed in meeting its other goal, to increase revenues for the state. 210Although 
the initial data was promising,211 the policy’s success in reimbursing the state for its 
welfare goals is decidedly mixed. Increasing the number of paternity establishments may 
end up having some noneconomic benefits for children but it has done little to increase 
the number of support orders for children on welfare. 212  Even if more orders were 
obtained and more support was collected from noncustodial fathers, one widely cited 
208
 Brito, supra note 23,; Marsha Albertson Fineman, Child Support Is Not the Answer: The Nature of 
Dependencies and Welfare Reform in CHILD SUPPORT: THE NEXT FRONTIER, supra note 123, 209.
209 See  supra notes 122-128 accompanying text.
210 See supra  notes 77-84 and accompanying .text.
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support order); The Child Support Improvement Project: Paternity Establishment, Denver, CO (1995) 
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study predicted that, given the poverty of this population of obligor fathers, even full 
payment of child support would only reduce combined spending for cash assistance, food 
stamps, and Medicaid by 8%.213 Moreover, there is substantial evidence that 
administrative costs of collecting child support may exceed the dollars collected to offset 
welfare costs.214
In addition to its ineffectiveness in reducing welfare costs, the linking of child 
support to welfare benefits harms low-income families in a variety of ways. The principle 
provision of the legislation that creates this link is the requirement that, as a condition of 
receiving full public benefits, recipients assign their rights to child support to the state.215
Welfare recipients must fulfill a “cooperation requirement” – by identifying the fathers of 
their children so the state can pursue those men for child support.216  Federal law has 
required assignment of support and cooperation since the late 1980’s but the PRWORA 
eliminated any pass through of child support to families217 and gave states broad 
discretion in determining what constitutes “cooperation” and whether “good cause” exists 
for non-cooperation.218
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Both the assignment and cooperation requirements create a number of problems 
for low-income families. An assignment requirement that prevents children from 
benefiting from the collection of child support hurts those children in a variety of ways.  
Studies have long suggested that fathers are more willing to pay child support if they 
know their money is actually going to the children.219 And fathers who are able to pay 
child support and do so tend to be more active in their children’s lives.220 In addition, 
even modest pass through payments can assist low-income families for whom child 
support may constitute about 25% of the average family income.221  Finally, eliminating 
the pass through may have an adverse impact on reducing welfare costs.  Those states 
that have opted for generous pass throughs have increased both the number of families 
leaving welfare222 and the amount of child support collected.223
Because of its direct link to the increase in paternity disestablishment, the 
cooperation requirement is even more troubling. First, the process of meeting the 
cooperation requirement is, at best, intrusive and demeaning for custodial mothers.  In 
some circumstances, it may also place mothers at grave risk of harm when putative 
fathers retaliate with intimidation, threats and violence after being identified.224  While a 
good cause exception for victims of domestic violence to the cooperation requirement has 
219
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been codified in federal welfare law since 1989, states have wide discretion in 
implementing this exception.  This discretion creates the potential that a state will limit 
the availability of this exception “to remove difficult cases from the welfare rolls.”225   Its 
effectiveness has also been limited because women “either did not know of its existence 
or could not verify their status as victims of abuse.”226
Most importantly, the cooperation requirement may also encourage identification 
of men who have neither a biological connection nor a desire to become the child’s 
psychological father.  Both the informality of the setting in which these identifications are 
made and the pressure imposed by making financial support dependent upon 
identification lead to paternity establishments that are later challenged when serious child 
support enforcement begins.227  Amending the statute to encourage rather than require
mothers seeking welfare to cooperate in identifying fathers would reduce the high rate of 
legal fathers who later seek to disestablish. 
B. Refining the Current System
Eliminating the compulsory assignment and cooperation requirements from 
federal child support law could do much to reduce the number of paternity 
225
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disestablishments that lead to fatherless children.228  But even if such sweeping change is 
not feasible at this time, modifications to the current framework can help to avoid the 
chain of unintended consequences described in this Article.  These proposals focus on 
three critical points in the child support process: paternity establishment, child support 
establishment and paternity disestablishment.229
1.     Paternity Establishment
An obvious solution to the problem of paternity disestablishments is to require 
genetic testing in all cases before legal recognition of paternity.230  More genetic testing 
would certainly reduce the number of later paternity disestablishments.  But mandatory 
testing presents a number of problems.  First, the obvious problem with such an approach 
is cost.  Even though the costs of such testing have come down significantly in the last 
decade,231 the average  cost for court approved laboratories is still at least $300.00.232
Imposing such costs on parties or the state for all paternity establishment—voluntary and 
contested-- would significantly undermine the goal of obtaining child support orders for 
as many children as possible.  
A genetic testing requirement might also present non-economic obstacles to the 
goal of having fathers in as many children’s lives as possible.  Practitioners in the field 
228
 While such a change would require a major rethinking of welfare policy, it could be achieved without 
changing the work and time limitations that were central to PRWORA and welfare reform in the 1990’s.  
Without conceding the value or viability of these provisions, they could be applied as part of the conditions 
for welfare receipt without requiring the recipient to identify the father.
229
 Many of the proposals discussed in this Article come from the Common Ground Project. This 
innovative project, a collaboration of the National Women’s Law Center and Center for Fathers, Families 
and Public Policy, is an effort to develop areas of consensus between low income mothers and fathers to 
“develop and advance public policy recommendations on child support and interrelated welfare and family 
law issues that promote effective coparenting relationships and ensure emotional and financial support of 
children.”(hereinafter “Common Ground Project”) DOLLARS AND SENSE, supra note 162, at 1.
230 See, e.g., Paula Roberts, Truth & Consequences Part I, 37 FAM. L.Q. 35, 42 (2003); Jennifer L. Merrill, 
Determining Legal Fatherhood: A Case for Genetic Paternity Establishment (unpublished paper on file 
with the Author)
231 See supra note 176.
232 FAMILY TIES, supra note 144, at 19.
50
report that an undetermined but substantial number of fathers who acknowledge or 
consent to paternity do so having doubts that they are biologically related to the children 
who are the subject of the paternity establishment.233  While some of these fathers will 
later seek to disestablish paternity,234 many will not. Those that do not seek 
disestablishment have stayed with the child’s mother or formed a strong emotional bond 
with the child or both.235  Many children, who might otherwise be fatherless, will get 
fathers through this process.  If genetic testing were required in all cases, many child 
support professionals believe these “volunteer” fathers would opt out after they are 
confronted with the test which removes any doubt that they share no genetic link with 
their children.236 As a result, many ultimately strong families would never be formed. 
Rather than require testing in all cases, testing should be encouraged in a number 
of ways. First, more resources must be devoted to giving putative fathers the verbal and 
written legal information required by federal law about the consequences of 
acknowledging or consenting to paternity.237  Ideally, this information should be 
explained before consents are obtained, by lawyers, or, at a minimum, by informed lay 
staff present at paternity acknowledgment sites. The Common Ground Project has 
proposed a series of reforms to provide both better-written materials and more informed 
and accessible staff in locations where paternity acknowledgments are made.238  These 
improved resources should help ensure that more putative fathers undergo genetic testing 
233
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before acknowledging paternity, and those who choose to forgo such testing, do so 
knowingly and voluntarily.
In addition to educating putative fathers about legal rights and obligations, the 
government should waive the costs of testing in all cases where testing is requested by 
the parties. Federal law currently requires the child support agency to advance the cost of 
the test if there is a financial need.239  But costs can be assessed later against putative 
fathers who deny paternity and are not excluded by the test.240  Waiving costs of all tests 
for low-income litigants regardless of result will result in greater “up front” costs for the 
state. But learning that the putative father is not the biological father at this early stage 
will avoid forfeiture of arrearages after paternity disestablishment, will provide an 
opportunity to determine whether a good cause exception exists to excuse the custodial 
mother from identifying the biological father, and will provide the opportunity to 
investigate alternative putative fathers at a point when there is still a possibility of 
identifying another man as the biological father.  Most importantly, it will avoid the 
trauma of paternity disestablishment for the children when they are older.  
2. Child Support Establishment and Modification
A variety of reforms can be made to the current child support establishment and 
modification process to strike a balance between effective child support enforcement and 
fair treatment of low-income obligors.  As a guiding principle for reforms at this stage, 
federal and state law should seek to “develop targeted, specific initiatives” to deal with 
239 See 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(B)(ii)(I)(1999).
240 FAMILY TIES, supra note 144 at 19; Despite the federal protection, some child support agencies routinely 
require prepayment for testing. See e.g., Wiggins v. Griner 843 A.2d 887 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) 
(putative father requesting a waiver of prepayment claiming indigency was denied the waiver and had to 
appeal to obtain order requiring that “the costs of genetic testing shall be borne by the county where the 
proceeding is pending.”)
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the problems faced by the “special population” of low-income obligors.241  These reforms 
should not signal a retreat from the rule-based formula approach to child support and a 
return to the discretionary approach that yielded low awards and inconsistent treatment 
even among families with the same income242.  Rather, these refinements recognize the 
particular burdens the current system places on low income obligors and should reduce 
the number of legal fathers who now view paternity disestablishment as the only defense 
against aggressive child support sanctions.
The first point of reform for the current system is to develop procedures that 
facilitate obligor participation in the development of child support orders. Under current 
procedures, child support orders are routinely entered without actual notice and 
participation by the noncustodial parent.243 Where support is set by administrative 
agencies rather than courts, service may be done by first class mail rather than personal 
service and hearings may be dispensed with entirely.244  Even where support is set in a 
judicial process, unrepresented obligors, not understanding the significance of the notice 
to appear, frequently do not attend hearings.245  There is, therefore, a high likelihood that 
support orders will be set by default order without income information and other input 
from the obligor.  Given these circumstances, states should develop easy-to-use 
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procedures for obligors to obtain relief to adjust the orders quickly so substantial 
arrearages do not accrue.  A few states have experimented with making child support 
orders set by “provisional or temporary orders to permit changes if the noncustodial 
parent appears and provides actual income information.”246  Alternatively, some states 
have extended the time for modifying or vacating default orders to permit obligor 
input.247
Once before the court or agency, the guidelines used to determine the amount of 
the support order need to be restructured to avoid unrealistically high orders.  While the 
needs of low-income fathers must always be balanced against the needs of custodial 
mothers and children,248 finding the right mix of incentives and sanctions is challenging 
at best. A variety of proposals have emerged from the American Law Institute249, the 
Common Ground Project 250and others251 that create the potential for greater fairness in 
child support orders for low-income obligors. While the proposals vary in their details, all 
include adjustments to minimize the unjust results for low-income obligors from the 
marginal expenditure approach of the Income Shares Guideline.252  For example, when 
determining the obligor’s financial capability, guidelines should be structured to include 
246
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an adjustment to the mandated support amount  to create a  “self support reserve” for  the 
obligor’s basic living expenses.253
Other proposals critique the use the use of  “presumptive minimum awards” 
These support orders, typically from $20.00 - $50.00 per month but may run higher, 
authorize courts and agencies to order support even where the obligor has no income.254
Such orders may be appropriate where the obligor has “the realistic capability of making 
a current financial contribution.”255  Where no such capability exists because of chronic 
unemployment or part time or seasonal employment, the courts should not order support. 
Instead, courts should set regular reviews and require these fathers to participate in job 
training, parenting classes, and, if applicable, substance abuse programs to assist them in 
meeting their support obligations.256
Refinements in the law also need to be made to address the substantial numbers of 
low-income obligors who are currently subject to unrealistically high orders and are 
facing sanctions for mounting arrearages.257 For example, federal law should be 
strengthened to encourage states to forgive arrearages when they are owed to the state 
and where the obligor’s income is at or near poverty level.258  Child support agencies 
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should also be more prudent in seeking sanctions.  For example, instead of automatic 
revocation of all licenses when support is overdue, agencies should consider permitting 
work-restricted licenses where the obligor’s income is dependent upon a professional or 
motor vehicle license. For the same reasons, when incarceration is used as a sanction for 
failure to pay child support, the sentence should include work release when it will 
facilitate the payment of child support.
And, as recommended at almost every point in this process, adequate resources 
must be devoted to provide greater access to legal representation or pro se assistance for 
timely intervention for those with legitimate bases for reducing or terminating child 
support--- e.g. fathers who are incarcerated, disabled, or who have assumed informal 
custody of children.259  Poverty legal assistance programs should also consider 
circumstances. Office of Child Support Enforcement, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Policy 
Interpretation Question (PIQ) 99-03 (Mar. 22, 1999) (“Compromise of Child Support Arrearages”), 
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redirecting resources to systemic reform for low-income noncustodial fathers, a group 
that has not been the traditional beneficiary of resources of such programs.260
 C.   Paternity Disestablishment
Perhaps the most complex challenge for reform in this area is the development of
sound policies for paternity disestablishment.  A number of competing interests are 
present in many situations in which a legal father who is not the biological father seeks to 
disestablish paternity.261  The factual circumstances underlying these disestablishment 
cases are many and varied. The mothers may have identified a non-biological father for 
“good” reasons – to get needed public benefits for her children while avoiding the threat 
of harm from the child’s abusive biological father.262  Or she may have identified a non-
biological father under less sympathetic circumstances.  She may have had multiple 
partners and been unsure about the paternity of  the child, or she may have identified a 
putative father to solidify her relationship with him because of a strong emotional, 
financial or other bond.263  Non-biological fathers, too, consent to paternity for a variety 
of reasons, some engendering more sympathy than others.  The putative father may 
indeed be a “duped dad”264 who was misled by a partner into believing he was the 
biological father and consented to paternity to meet his legal and emotional obligations to 
the child. Or he may have known he was not the biological father or had doubts but 
260
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wanted to solidify his relationship with the mother, child, or both, regardless of genetic 
link.265  Or he may have anticipated benefiting from the welfare payments that followed 
paternity establishment, unaware of the child support obligations he would face as a 
consequence.266
Whatever the circumstances, both adults share some responsibility for the 
troubling circumstances in which they and their child find themselves if years later the 
father seeks to disestablish paternity. Regardless of their motivations, the mother’s 
actions in identifying the putative father and the father’s actions in consenting to 
paternity without genetic testing have a number of consequences.  Their actions have 
prevented further efforts to identify the biological father and, in many instances, have 
resulted in the formation of an emotional and/or financial bond between the putative 
father and the child.  The only truly innocent victim in these cases is the child.  Given 
that, any policy solution must resolve competing interests in favor of the child. Like most 
sound family regulation, the strongest approaches include clearly defined rules with some 
limited discretion.
1.    Statute of Limitations
A statute of limitations which provides a clean “cut off” for claims of paternity 
disestablishment has the virtue of certainty, predictability, and simplicity. Putative fathers 
can be easily informed about their rights to challenge a paternity determination and 
custodial mothers know when a paternity acknowledgment or order will be permanent.  
265
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When combined with social science research on child development, such an approach 
also contributes to decisions that are in the best interests of the children.  
Two issues that must be resolved in developing a child focused statute of 
limitations are: 1) the appropriate length of time for the statute of limitations and 2) the 
point in time that triggers the statute.  Some statutes run from the time of the child’s birth 
and others run from the time the father learns of the “fraud,” that led to his status as legal 
father.  If the statute of limitations is tolled until the father alleges he learned of the 
“fraud,” the proceeding may be brought long after a strong bond with the child has 
formed.267  If the child’s interest is to take precedence over fairness to fathers, the time 
limit should run from the child’s birth.  
In deciding the number of years for the statute of limitations, states that have such 
statutes vary in length from one year268 to five years.269  While the time within which a 
father and child bond will vary with the frequency of contact and the temperaments of the 
parties involved, most child development specialists feel that with at least minimal 
contact between father and child this bond forms within the first two years of the child’s 
life.270  Thus, a statute of limitations that protects children from the possibility of genetic 
testing and potential disestablishment after the child reaches the age of two is best suited 
267
 Although state law often regulates when tests can be ordered and admitted into evidence, the wide 
availability of genetic testing kits makes testing without either a court order or the custodial parent’s 
permission possible.  See supra note 178.
268 See L.A. CIV. CODE. ANN. ART. 189 (West. Supp. 2001) (enforcing one year time limitation strictly 
unless the child is born more than 300 days after the parents are legally separated).
269 ALASKA STAT. § 25.27.166 (providing a three-year statute of limitations from the date of child’s birth or 
the time the putative father knew or should have known of paternity); see also, Ronald Nelson, supra note 
183; COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-107(1)(b) (2002).
270
 Reporter Notes, UPA (2000) (finding that allowing such paternity actions after the child’s 2nd birthday 
will “have severe consequences for the child.” See also, Joan B. Kelly & Michael E. Lamb, Using Child 
Development Research to Make Appropriate Custody and Access Decisions for Young Children, 38 FAM. & 
CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 297 (2000); In a 1991-1992 study of sixteen large urban areas nationwide, 72% 
of all domestic relations cases involved at least one unrepresented party.  The child’s bond to the father can 
occur even without frequent contact and even where the father does not reciprocate. See Gantt, supra note 
199, at 7-8.
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to protect the child’s interests.  This is the approach followed under the Uniform 
Paternity Act of 2000 and has been adopted in a handful of states.271
Imposing a uniform statute of limitations will certainly result in requiring greater 
numbers of nonbiological social fathers to remain legal fathers.  Legal recognition of 
such fathers is consistent with the sound child-centered policies that are developing in the 
custody area272 and should have equal application in paternity decisions.
2. Best Interests Test
Even where the request to disestablish paternity is made within the statute of 
limitations, all decisions concerning paternity disestablishment should be made under a 
“best interests of the child” standard.  A custodial parent’s decisions on behalf of her 
child are often presumed to be in the child’s best interests.273 There are, however, a 
number of circumstances in paternity contests in which the custodial mother may support 
the legal father’s request for paternity disestablishment regardless of the interests of the 
child.  Even if she believes the legal father is the biological father, she may not be 
interested in any support from him.  She has supported the child herself without any help 
from the legal father or is not likely to receive his support because the state has provided 
benefits.  In other cases where there is genuine doubt as to the legal father’s biological 
link, she may agree it is only fair to let the legal father “off the hook.”  Or she may 
believe the legal father voluntarily became the psychological father to the child, but the 
legal father may have intimidated or regularly harassed the mother about “setting the 
271
 UPA (2000) § 607(a); OKLA.STAT.ANN. tit. 10 § 3 (West 1998); See also, WASH. STAT. RCW 
26.26.300
272 See supra  notes 61-69 and accompanying text.
273 See, e.g. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. AT 57 (2000). Given the potentially conflicting interests of the 
parents and child in paternity cases, a provision requiring separate counsel to guide the court in its best 
interests analysis may be needed.  The UPA’s model statute contains such a provision.  UPA (2000) § 612. 
See also, Jane C. Murphy and Cheri Levin, When Daddy Wants Out: The Issue of Paternity, 32 MD. BAR 
JOURNAL 10 (2000).
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record straight.” The mother may acquiesce under pressure from the legal father or 
because she feels that she and her child would be better off without the negative presence 
of the legal father. Thus, courts should not “rubber stamp” a mother’s acquiescence in a 
request but should make an independent determination as to whether a paternity 
disestablishment is in the best interests of the child.274
While some states have adopted this approach,275 many have not.276  And even 
those that have adopted the standard have not applied it with any consistency, often 
articulating the standard but giving greater deference to fairness for fathers.277 Thus, 
courts need specific factors to assist them in applying the best interest standard in 
paternity disestablishment cases.  Factors that should guide the court in this context 
include examining:
1) the past relationship and existing bond between the child and the legal 
father;
2) whether there is an existing relationship with another de facto or 
biological father or the potential to create such a relationship; 
3) the child’s current physical and emotional needs;
4) the child’s need to ascertain genetic information for the purpose of 
medical treatment or genealogical history.278
274
 Murphy & Levin, supra note 270 at 12.
275 See e.g., Ferguson v. Winston, 996 P.2d 841 (Kansas App. 2000); In re marriage of Ross, 783 P.2d 331 
(Kansas 1989); Sleeper v. Sleeper, 929 P.2d 1028 (Oregon App. 1997); McDaniels v. Carlson, 738 P.2d 
254 (Wash. 1987); In the Interest of J.A.U., 47 P.3d 327 (Colo. 2002);____________________, 185 A.D. 
2d. 977 (N.Y.______); Paternity of Adam; 903 P.2d 211 (Mont. 1995); Tuboron v. Weisberg, 394 N.W.2d 
601 (Minn. 1986).
276 See supra  notes 180 and 181.
277 Case cite
278 Turner v. Wisted, 327 Md. 106, 116-17, 607 A.2d 935, 940 (1992). While Maryland courts have 
approved a best interest standard in the context of a request to reopen paternity where the mother of the 
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Applying such factors will assist courts in resolving paternity disestablishment cases in a 
way that appropriately places the child’s interests above the state’s and parents’.
Conclusion
State and federal child support and welfare policies that aggressively encourage 
paternity establishment and focus enforcement efforts on low-income fathers have 
contributed to a new definition of fatherhood based exclusively on biology and economic 
support.  This definition hurts the state, low-income families, and, most especially, 
children.  Legal fathers may be willing to maintain a formal connection with children 
who are at risk of becoming fatherless.  But current child support policies that privilege 
the economic function of fatherhood above all others do not permit functional fathers to 
assume emotional and caretaking responsibilities without assuming full financial 
responsibilities.  Legal fathers, particularly low-income obligors, must often choose 
between irreparably harming a child they have called their own for many years or face 
financial ruin.  
The legal definition of fatherhood must be broad and flexible enough to resolve 
paternity conflicts in ways that stabilize families and protect children.  This requires 
rethinking the current child enforcement system to develop policies that discourage 
uninformed paternity consents on the front end. And, if challenges to paternity are 
permitted, legislatures and courts need to define fatherhood broadly enough so that 
decisions about paternity disestablishment are grounded in the child’s best interest at the 
backend.  In addition, while rigorous child support enforcement policies are essential to
middle and upper income custodial parents and children, the application of these policies 
child was married, it has not applied this standard in cases where the mother is unmarried. Langston v. 
Riffe, supra note 183.
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to low-income, fragile families must be reexamined to discourage functional fathers from 
seeking paternity disestablishment even when there is no biological or marital connection 
with the child or her mother. Creating a legal definition of fatherhood to account for the 
complexity of families today is a difficult task but one that must have as its goal 
protecting children and preventing the loss of fathers in their lives.  
